HANDBOOK

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Cordon and Search



Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

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FOREWORD

This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) handbook provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for planning and executing a cordon and search. Cordon and search is a daunting task in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Our leaders, Soldiers, and units must be able to readily adapt and seize advantages to meet mission objectives. Cordon and search missions are critical tasks that commanders and staffs must concisely plan, prepare, and execute. Careful consideration of follow-on effects is crucial, especially during the stability operations and support operations (SOSO) phase. It is difficult to strike a balance between targeting potential belligerents and safeguarding and winning the hearts and minds of non-combatants. Achieving this balance is a challenge we must overcome as we continue our relentless assault on the global war on terrorism.



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CORDON AND SEARCH HANDBOOK

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Soldier's Creed

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.

Introduction

THE CORDON AND SEARCH: A COMPLEX MISSION WITHIN THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Holden, Task Force 1 Senior Observer/Controller, JRTC Operations Group

FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, paragraph 14-12 states that "a company team may be required to perform a search as part of a battalion task force or independently." Conduct of a cordon and search operation is an infantry company collective task specified in training guidance for ongoing military operations in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Yet none of the infantry series field manuals (FMs) defines or offers tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the cordon and search. These articles on cordon and search procedures and trends from ongoing training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) have been compiled in an effort to fill that doctrinal void and offer crucial tactical information on military operations and tasks associated with both OIF and OEF. This handbook is intended for leaders at all levels that are involved in the combat readiness of our armed forces. The authors are primarily JRTC observer/controllers (O/Cs), many with recent experience in theater, who, every month, teach, coach, and mentor combat arms leaders deploying into combat operations.

Conducting a cordon and search operation in an urban area is the primary "bread and butter" stability operations and support operations critical task in the contemporary operating environment (COE). The COE contains many variables that affect operations. These variables include the military capabilities of a tough and adaptable enemy armed with improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and AK-47s who generally do not abide by established laws of land warfare; an ambiguous military and political situation; criminal organizations; unruly civilians on the battlefield; information operations that include the impact of embedded media; religious and cultural considerations; and the challenging physical environments (urban sprawl or hot desert). All these variables combine to create a challenging, non-linear battlefield for our armed forces.

Lieutenant General (LTG) William Wallace, Commander, Combined Arms Center, stated during a recent JRTC visit that the COE is harder, less conventional, and more simultaneous than ever before, and he expressed the desire for all CTCs to replicate the tough COE found in Afghanistan and Iraq. The goal of COE implementation in Army training is to produce an objective force of leaders, Soldiers and units capable of rapidly adapting and optimizing capabilities to achieve mission objectives. This complex task includes the cordon and search mission with its own multitude of sub- tasks including how to tactically move to the targeted destination and return safely, route and urban area reconnaissance, patrol operations, tactical convoys, establishing checkpoints and/or roadblocks, reacting to civil disturbance operations, reacting to sniper fire, employing snipers, and searching a building/room.

During all operations, commanders must constantly assess the situation in terms of the application and interrelation of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) factors. When considering the cordon and search operation in a COE, commanders will discover they must apply METT-TC differently than they would during “normal” offensive or defensive operations. The “enemy,” for example, may be a set of ambiguous threats and potential adversaries. Depending on METT-TC, the commander must contemplate what type of a cordon and search entry (i.e., aggressive, passive, knock on the door, bust down the door, etc.) is in "synch" with their higher commander’s intent. Are higher commanders one and two levels up oriented on winning hearts and minds, or are they focused on stabilizing the area? If the intent is a balance between the two, the level of aggressiveness may be more closely tied to executing “cordon and knock” TTP.

Commanders and their staff must not only plan, prepare, and execute the cordon and search task, they must also analyze the ramifications and repercussions of the action itself. For a time, it was the practice of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to follow each cordon and search operation with an intense information operation campaign (which included distributing soccer balls to the children) to achieve a balance between attaining target success and winning hearts and minds.

Executing a cordon and search in the COE is a thinking man’s game. Training and educating our leaders and Soldiers on the intricacies of the cordon and search at home station is critical for the success of our joint forces on the COE battlefield. At JRTC we are committed to teaching units the fundamentals of the cordon and search, and we think this series of articles published by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is an excellent starting point.

Chapter 1

EXECUTING THE CORDON AND SEARCH: RECENT OBSERVED TRENDS

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Holden,
Task Force 1 Senior Observer/Controller, JRTC Operations Group

What follows is a summary of unit "positive performance" and "needs emphasis" observations based on the assessments of JRTC observer/controllers (O/Cs) as units executed cordon and search situational training exercises (STXs) and rotations under a stressful and demanding contemporary operational environment (COE). Executing cordon and search is a challenging mission. Understanding the commander's intent, considering the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), and understanding stability operations and support operations (SOSO) doctrine are all crucial to becoming proficient in leading a cordon and search operation.

Soldiers and leaders at the JRTC train in complex, tough, stressful conditions that incorporate as many variables of the COE as possible. **FM 3-06, *Urban Operations***, aptly states: "Without a tightly coordinated civil-military effort, success will be difficult or impossible to achieve. Commanders who can understand and cope with the complexities of stability operations and support operations gain insights that directly apply to executing any urban operation." A company commander who was involved in more than 100 cordon and search missions explains this complex COE:

> American Soldiers are facing men with a cell phone in one hand, a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) in the other, and ill-conceived hatred in their heart. This enemy is asymmetric in the most unpredictable way…. Urban environments present so many threats, ranging from rooftop shootings and drive-by shootings to civil unrest against the cordon and search….

At JRTC, units and Soldiers face many of these same challenging COE variables. While executing the cordon and search here at JRTC, units face friction, demanding timelines, a world class opposing force armed with a multitude of weapons, and an environment set up to replicate, as nearly as possible, the COE. Conducting cordon and search operations in the COE presents a unique challenge for units in their initial phases of train-up for combat deployment. Success at JRTC does not mean "killing the opposing forces (OPFOR)," but rather showing constant improvement and demonstrating a positive attitude to learn. Based on these criteria, the units observed, whose performance is described below, were successful at JRTC.

THE TRENDS

The following trends are organized by battlefield operating system (BOS).

Intelligence

Positive Performance:

- **Fire support officer (FSO) duties:** Companies/troops began using their company/troop FSO as both an information officer and a company/troop intelligence officer. In SOSO, a company commander and his executive officer (XO) cannot do it all. Although lethal indirect fires have their limitations in the challenging urban environment, fire support planning is critical. Targeting restrictions within a built-up area and rules of engagement (ROE) complexities may limit the use of indirect, lethal fires; however, they must always be planned for. Once the FSO and his fire support element team become involved in patrol debriefings, distributing battalion intelligence summaries (INTSUMs), focusing the cordon and search teams on priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and helping link each of these teams with the proper information operations (IO) theme, they become major combat multipliers.

- **Negotiations:** Company commanders demonstrated excellent negotiation techniques and were effective when dealing with key personnel in the villages. However, it must noted that these commanders had previously engaged in rigorous bi-lateral preparatory training sessions at JRTC with foreign language speakers posing as Arab village leaders. These role-players engaged their U.S. coalition counterparts with a plethora of troublesome vignettes to include sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash (SWEAT) initiative problems, pay issues, cultural dilemmas, or other issues.

Needs Emphasis:

- **Searches:** In general, unit searches of buildings, vehicles, and personnel were unsatisfactory. They often missed critical PIR such as caches, maps, and weapons. Units are not properly incorporating these searches in their rehearsals and troop-leading procedures. Units must establish disciplined and standardized search standing operating procedures (SOPs) to ensure searches are systematic, thorough, PIR-focused, and executed in a secure fashion.

- **Target acquisition:** Individual Soldiers are not adequately identifying and reporting suspected threats. Units' initial lack of combat focus and inattention allowed Soldiers to miss a threat until they were engaged. Often, Soldiers would engage a perceived threat prior to properly identifying the target, leading to innocent civilians being engaged. Company commanders and

platoon leaders, in conjunction with their fire support partners, are studying black, gray, and white lists, but the critical intelligence information is not getting down to Soldier level.

Maneuver

Positive Performance:

- **Sniper employment at the battalion level:** Generally speaking, the battalion staff, principally the battalion S2 and S3, would ensure the battalion level scouts were PIR-focused, understood the proper rules of engagement, planned for adequate fire control measures, established back-up communications, and had trained their snipers (**Note:** Most snipers had graduated from the Fort Benning sniper course or some type of special operations sniper course at home station).

- **Integrating and planning aviation attack aircraft**: Aviation was integrated effectively during cordon and search operations; initial planning for attack by fire positions, fire control measures, and task and purpose were outstanding. However, more emphasis must be placed on ground commanders providing follow-on tasks and purposes for the aviation team after the inner cordon is set. Rehearsing different contingencies during the full dress rehearsal will minimize fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), friction, and unnecessary chatter on the radio. Aviation team leaders and ground commanders often lost situational awareness when the ground commanders' span of control was challenged during the search phase or when there was a civilian disturbance. The aviation liaison officer (LNO), at a minimum, should attend the cordon and search rehearsal (normally it is impossible for the actual pilots to attend the rehearsal due to crew rest). See attached articles on aviation planning and execution during the cordon and search.

Needs Emphasis:

- **Security/weapon posture:** During the initial stages of a JRTC rotation, units constantly had negligent weapon discharges during cordon and search operations. Unit leaders must establish standardized clearing procedures and maintain strict enforcement of the proper weapon fire control standards. Too many Soldiers experienced negligent discharges because they failed to place their weapon back on safe after firing. Leaders were not checking. Units did not fix negligent discharges until the problem received the proper command emphasis. It was mandated that the first noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the Soldier's chain of command must observe the Soldier execute proper clearing procedures.

  Soldiers must look like "they mean business": First-hand reports from OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) state categorically that the enemy goes after the "weak link." Soldiers

who are well rehearsed, well armed, and well versed on their task and purpose normally are a fearsome threat. The enemy attacks the weak – Soldiers with poor weapon posture, who are NOT mission-focused, and who look scared or unconfident.

- **Establishing a tactical check point (TCP):** Although most units train on establishing a TCP prior to JRTC deployment, company-level leaders consistently overlooked sound tactical principles. Setting up the outer cordon by establishing a series of TCPs at primary avenues of approach is similar to the principles of setting up left and right far security when executing a typical Ranger school ambush. Ranger cadre coach their students to place the left and right security in covered and concealed locations that are far enough from the assaulting force to provide early warning and protection. A common deficiency during cordon and search operations was the emplacement of the outer cordon so close to the targeted building that it could not provide early warning for the inner cordon and search teams. Do not place your left and right security in close visual proximity to your assaulting element, doing so denies your team both early warning and protection. Leaders need to recall the basic doctrinal principles of planning, reconnaissance, control, security, and common sense.

- **React to civil disturbance:** Units are initially overwhelmed and intimidated by hostile crowds. They are unwilling to take forceful action to control crowds. Units executed multiple iterations of crowd control during the course of the rotation and were normally trained on this task by end of exercise (ENDEX). Units must rehearse executing friendly TTP for hostile crowds as published per Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) ***Smart Card # 1.***

- **Soldier use of rules of engagement (ROE) knowledge:** Soldiers were not comfortable with the CFLCC ROE. In one incident at JRTC, a noncommissioned officer (NCO) ordered a Soldier to kill a captured former regime element (FRE) leader even though he had his hands raised in surrender. In addition, villagers who were detained for questioning were often shot if they attempted to escape, even though they may have been innocent. In several different events, the escaping detainees who were shot were unarmed and of no threat to the friendly force (BLUFOR) unit. In and out of theater continue to use ROE vignette training.

- **Enter/clear room:** Non-infantry units not familiar with battle drills must execute repetitive battle drill training, especially entering and clearing a room/building. Units cannot do this enough. (See Chapter 8 on precision room clearing.)

- **React to contact:** Units must practice this battle drill, both mounted and dismounted, until it becomes routine. Leaders at all levels must establish proper fire commands and assign proper fire control measures. Read and apply **FM 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad***. Rehearse what it says!

- **Challenge of company-designated scouts**: Company sniper teams generally were plagued with poor communication; they were unable to forward intelligence to higher headquarters. Additionally, company snipers were normally not well versed in their contingency plans and when compromised, often caused friction and crisis at company and battalion level. Snipers at the company level often lacked confidence in their engagement criteria and failed to engage key enemy high priority targets such as mortar teams, black-listed personnel, and enemy carrying RPGs.

Command and Control

Positive Performance:

- **Situational awareness:** Soldiers armed with mission knowledge are less likely to make mistakes than Soldiers who lack situational awareness. After each cordon and search iteration, leaders at all levels came to understand the importance of planning, preparing, and executing proper troop-leading procedures for the purpose of educating and preparing their Soldiers for combat. Leaders realized how important it is to have all Soldiers in possession of their assigned equipment prior to departure (pre-combat inspections [PCIs]). Through a series of painful lessons such as flat tires, weapon malfunctions, no batteries in the Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (PLGR) or advanced combat optical sites, or other problems, leaders realized the importance of ensuring all equipment and weapons function properly (pre-combat checks [PCCs]). Three-dimensional terrain models used to enhance Soldier knowledge and plan for fire control contingencies were continuously improved during each cordon and search iteration. Company commanders went from conducting rehearsals on a pin-up map board to becoming believers in company full dress rehearsals attended by every Soldier in the unit. Platoons and squads also improved in their conduct of specific rehearsals. They learned the importance of warning orders that allow subordinates to know as soon as possible what their general task and purpose is going to be. Commanders were often challenged with time management. Initially, company commanders often used the "2/3 to 1/3 rule" rather than vice versa. The after action review (AAR) process always brought this deficiency to light and time management at all levels quickly improved. (See the subsequent cordon and search chapters that cover troop leader procedures in detail.)

Needs Emphasis:

- **Synchronization and condition setting:** Despite the improved company rehearsals, company commanders were challenged in articulating their vision and end state. This caused major synchronization challenges between the inner and outer cordon and caused major gaps in time between the activations of the inner and outer cordon; these lapses allowed hostile crowds to assemble

and become almost impossible to control. As for setting the conditions, company inner cordons initially failed to prevent civilian disruption of the search and protect the search teams from threat activity.

The inner and outer cordon did not conduct operations simultaneously. For example, the unit commander would establish a platoon-sized outer cordon composed of mounted and dismounted assets in direct sight of the village occupants, thus giving up the principle of surprise. As a result, villagers would leave their village (because no inner cordon was set up, nor were any command messages issued) to ask the outer cordon soldiers what they were doing. When the inner cordon and unit leadership allow too much time to elapse before approaching and informing the villagers of their intent, the civilians and/or the enemy will take advantage of this time gap to interfere with the friendly commander's decision-making cycle. Establishment of the inner and outer cordon should be a rehearsed simultaneous action that helps set the conditions for a successful operation. Again, the commander must incorporate METT-TC in determining timing, inner and outer cordon triggers, and when to initiate information operations (IO) in order to engage the villagers.

- **Establish/operate company command post:** Company commanders had problems establishing and operating a company command post to receive, collect, and distribute critical information. Important information passed from the company commander to his command post during a mission often failed to reach the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). This lack of critical commander’s information requirements (CCIR) being sent forward normally caused a information vacuum which, in turn, affected the battalion commander’s decision points such as reserve or quick reaction force (QRF) commitment, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for a massive casualty (MASCAL) event, tactical psychological operations team (TPT) or tactical human intelligence team (THT) activation.

- **Direct fire planning:** Numerous fratricides, both with BLUEFOR units and against civilians on the battlefield (COBs) were common during initial cordon and search iterations. These were attributed to numerous troop-leading procedure errors including inadequate initial company rehearsals that did not incorporate fire control measures; enemy attack contingencies; limited repetitions of battle drills (react to contact, clear a room/clear a building, etc.) during the rehearsal phase; and failure to plan for direct fire within the village. Additionally, most ground commanders, leaders, and Soldiers were unaware of weapons effects on buildings and their orientation of fires from ground and air weapons such as 240B machine gun (MG), 50 cal, and 25-mm which caused the unnecessary deaths of numerous innocent COBs.

Fire Support

Positive Performance:

- **Effects-based operations and information operations:** FSE (fire support element) members are increasingly engaged in effects-based operations and IO and are therefore increasingly aware of their duties and responsibilities in these areas. (See comments under "Intelligence: Positive Performance," paragraph [1].) Battalion task force (TF) commanders, after observing an initial array of JRTC company cordon and search missions, began identifying several areas of concern, such as setting the conditions, IO themes, and the importance of village engagement. Consequently, the TF commanders began placing an increasing amount of command emphasis on the daily targeting meeting. TF commanders and their staffs understand the importance of establishing a solid battle rhythm which includes holding habitual, well-planned, daily targeting meetings in order to ensure the proper villagers, IO themes, enemy, mosques, imams, and tribal leaders are targeted during cordon and search operations.

Needs Emphasis:

- **Integration of mortars:** As units get more involved with information operations, effects-based operations, and the planning of non-lethal fires, they consistently suffer degradation in indirect fire planning, preparation, and execution. During cordon and search operations, mortar platoons seldom, if ever, achieved the five points of accurate fires. Indirect fire accuracy challenges include the following:

    - Units did not properly request/receive meteorological (MET) messages.

    - Units did not properly coordinate to have the field artillery (FA) position azimuth determining system (PADS) survey the mortar guns in order to allow commonality between the mortars and the FA firing batteries. Units did not establish an easting oriented line (EOL), normally signifying the mortar platoon failed to properly declinate the aiming circle and ensure it was on line.

    - Poor target location was caused by untrained observers who were often disoriented and not properly trained and rehearsed in call for fire and registration procedures.

    - Unsatisfactory declination and boresighting were often caused by poor leader PCIs and fire direction center (FDC) failure to redeclinate after a mortar platoon/section displacement or electrical storm.

- Units failed to register their mortars or, when they attempted to do so, failed to accomplish the basic fundamentals of mortar registration including:
  - Failing to properly coordinate with adjacent units during registration, causing numerous near fratricides
  - Poor observation plan registering the rounds
  - Poor communication and coordination between the mortar platoon and battalion FSO. In most instances the battalion FSO failed to inform the brigade FSO, which led to radar activation and follow-on brigade combat team counterfire drill
  - Units normally registered out of transfer limits (basically registering in the opposite direction of the unit's primary direction of fire which will affect the gun's accuracy)

- **Information operations integration:** Units were challenged with just about all aspects of IO integration. In cases where the TPT, proven to be an outstanding combat multiplier in OIF and OEF, was used, messages during a cordon and search were initially broadcast in Arabic only. Messages need to be in both Arabic and English to facilitate both friendly and villager situational awareness and understanding. Because of improper positioning of the TPT, friendly forces and villagers did not always hear messages. Units need to rehearse TPT activation and the established triggers for movement. Units should assign a ground maneuver leader to constantly check on whether or not the TPT broadcast can be heard. One TTP a battalion might consider is using the experience and tactical savvy of the command sergeant major to ensure the effectiveness of the TPT broadcasts. At company level, at a minimum, a leader in the inner cordon must be selected who possesses solid communications with the TPT and the unit commander.

  Non-lethal fires were normally neither scripted nor rehearsed. Generally speaking, most company commanders' span of control could not support effective use of the TPT. Company commanders were normally competent in executing an inner and outer cordon, but the preparation and execution of the proper TPT triggers to efficiently utilize the non-lethal fires were often above their skill level. Units that established a battalion-level TAC, composed both of a mounted command and control (C2) cell and the TPT, during a cordon and search was the best TTP observed in both combat operations and at JRTC. The battalion tactical command post (TAC), after the appropriate rehearsed trigger (such as a foothold becoming secure or a specific building being cleared) has been executed, delivers the TPT forward to a pre-planned position via a

security escort team, in order to provide general support to the company as it delivers effective non-lethal fires.

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability

Positive Performance:

Class (CL) IV concertina: The majority of units planned and procured sufficient CL IV concertina in preparation for inner and outer cordon actions. Concertina is of supreme importance to canalize, separate, and block villagers, as well as protect friendly search teams. Units must establish sound SOPs, PCIs, and PCCs to ensure the proper loading and transporting of concertina. Numerous (and often humorous) incidents of Soldiers unable to quickly uncoil concertina at the proper time and place caused unnecessary friction in the operation.

Needs Emphasis:

Anti-improvised explosive device (IED) measures: Units must continuously plan, prepare, and use anti-improvised explosive device (IED) measures as they execute cordon and search operations. As more emphasis was placed on the inner and outer cordon synchronization, units placed less time on route reconnaissance, IED battle drills, IED predictive analysis, and IED event templates. Rehearsing all aspects of route travel to and from the objective is just as important as the cordon and search itself.

Combat Service Support

Positive Performance:

Planning and executing casualty collection: First sergeants and platoon sergeants were normally very proactive in planning and executing casualty collection. Each iteration showed constant improvement in treatment, triage, and evacuation. It is critical that combat medics and designated combat lifesavers have their medic and combat lifesaver (CLS) bags inspected for possession of proper CL VIII supplies prior to this dangerous operation.

Needs Emphasis:

- **Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) planning:** Failure by battalion staffs to assign sufficient numbers of vehicles prepared for casualty evacuation resulted in first sergeants (1SGs) and platoon sergeants (PSGs) giving “hey you” tasks rather than having planned and rehearsed teams and vehicles. Normally, leaders must assign casualty collection points (CCPs) in secured buildings. Leaders must ensure, via backbriefs and rehearsals, that all Soldiers are aware of these designated CCPs. Commanders must plan for both air and ground evacuation. The commanders must visualize the physical act of evacuating casualties that will in turn assist in providing guidance to non-commissioned officers

(NCOs) and the executive officer (XO). Company commanders should plan on having ground ambulances forward with their team.

Forward medical team: During a complex operation involving battalion resources and based on METT-TC, the battalion task force commander should consider establishing a combat medical team forward with the TAC. Having the forward medical team with the TAC will decrease the company commander's span of control during this complex operation. A METT-TC consideration, depending on anticipated casualties, is to compose a team of ground ambulances, a physician assistant (PA) or doctor, and a mobile security team, depending on evacuation routes and distances. As a TTP, consider a PA in the advanced trauma mode, positioned in the TAC to go forward during both real combat missions and at JRTC. This TTP saved many lives due to quick responsiveness, treatment, triage, and evacuation.

CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps it is best to look at the cordon and search as the COE in its purest form. The trends above show that battlefield operating system (BOS) integration and synchronization are the most consistent challenges in executing such operations. The enemy is indistinct. The battlefield is not only non-linear, the outer cordon, the inner cordon, and the search are non-contiguous elements of the same operation. Success depends on situational awareness, integration, and synchronization between those disparate elements. Just mounting a cordon and search operation calls into play every mission task essential for training for OIF and OEF. And, as shown above, in the case of fire support, improvement in planning and executing non-lethal effects-based operations cannot be allowed to degrade skills in providing lethal fires.

Chapter 2

FUNDAMENTALS

Captain Adam Carson, Task Force 1, JRTC Operations Group

Surprise: It is doubtful you can completely surprise an insurgent in an area of operations; however, the use of surprise based on timing or method when emplacing the outer cordon, inner cordon, and search element will increase the probability of success of the mission. Using surprise to establish the cordon will prevent the escape of individual targets and protect the forces conducting the operation. In the urban environment, the quicker the cordon isolates the objective, the greater the likelihood of achieving surprise. A time-sensitive target may require an immediate launch, whereas a more deliberate target may allow for timing based on vulnerabilities.

Speed: Speed is a relative term. If you go so fast that you miss targets of opportunity, speed can become costly. However, time spent on the target area will increase the probability of taking friendly force casualties. The commander needs to spend as little time as possible searching and disrupting the local population. Search team and outer cordon emplaced simultaneously, or search team in first and cordons in second needs to be determined by mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

Concentration: The commander needs to assess the right combat force ratio to accomplish the mission and plan for using all his combat multipliers (aviation, snipers, tactical psychological operations team [TPT], civil affairs [CA], female searchers, video cameras, digital cameras, tactical human intelligence teams [THTs], and local forces). A commander has to think of concentrating those assets at the right place and at the right time. The right time may be establishing an overwatch position that can survey the area as the main effort withdraws or inserts. Always infiltrate dismounted short of the objective. Infiltrating dismounted is much more intimidating for the lone enemy shooter/insurgent. The same goes for the exfiltrate off the objective.

Flexibility: Plan for a reserve/quick reaction force (QRF) that is mobile, lethal, and nearby to allow for flexibility of the inner cordon, outer cordon, and search element. The commander needs to address the seven forms of contact in his rehearsals to increase the chances of mission success. In planning for the QRF the commander must address the commitment criteria in his operations order (OPORD). Iraqi police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (CDC) support will free up more Soldiers for search teams and depending on language skills, these elements give Soldiers more capability to communicate with the local populace.

Audacity: "Cost versus reward." The principle of audacity relies on opportunity, either presented or created. You set the conditions for a created opportunity. Beware of an opportunity that presents itself; it may be a trap. During the planning of any cordon and search mission always leave an open escape route in order to create opportunities. Video taping of a search area may create information operations (IO) and human intelligence (HUMINT) opportunities. Most cordon and search missions will be HUMINT driven.

Do not make decisions based on one HUMINT source. Try to use at least two HUMINT sources to make decisions on confirmed targets. Conduct your planning as if conducting a movement to contact in an urban environment. Think offensively. To destroy the enemy's will, company commanders must be creative and aggressive . Remember, follow up large-scale cordon and sweeps with civil military operations (CMO). Treat locals with respect and reap the rewards through the use of HUMINT.

Chapter 3

OUTER CORDON

Captain Theo K. Moore, Task Force 1, JRTC Operations Group

The outer cordon is an integral element in any cordon and search operation, and it requires detailed planning, effective coordination, and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms effects, lethal and non-lethal, sought by the commander.

TRENDS

The following are some common mistakes made by outer cordon elements:

- The outer cordon element is not given the correct task and purpose, for example: " interdict" versus "block."
- The outer cordon element is not given specific instructions or criteria for searching, detaining, and passing traffic through their positions and therefore is not an effective/active part of the search.
- There is a lack of communications between the outer cordon element and the other cordon and search elements which leads to an overall lack of situational awareness (SA).
- There is a lack of a direct fire plan, necessary control measures, weapons control status, and engagement criteria.
- Elements are not well rehearsed and prepared to communicate with and execute searches of personnel and vehicles.
- There is a lack of personnel and vehicle/personnel search and holding areas.
- There is a lack of overall synchronization between the outer cordon and the other elements.

MISSIONS AND PURPOSES

The security/outer cordon element has several purposes: to prevent the escape of targeted personnel and materials, to protect the search element from threat reinforcement (direct and indirect fires and personnel and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices), and to participate in the search. Typical tactical tasks include interdict, isolate, block, contain, deny, and secure. The reserve element may be co-located with elements of the security/outer cordon element. Command and control (C2) of the reserve element, however, will normally be retained by the cordon and search commander.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The outer cordon element is under the command and control of the cordon and search commander. The leader of the outer cordon element must

develop and maintain situational awareness of his area of responsibility, as well as the areas of the inner cordon and the search elements. This will enable the leader to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect fires, and facilitate the achievement of the element's task and purpose. Communications systems and reporting procedures must be implemented to facilitate situational awareness (SA) for the entire element.

TASK ORGANIZATION

Doctrinally, the outer cordon element is referred to as the security element, and the security element leader may C2 both the inner and outer cordon elements. The inner cordon element may also be task organized under the search element or be a separate subordinate element altogether. Each subordinate outer cordon element (traffic control point [TCP], blocking position) must have a designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Depending upon the element's tactical task and factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), weapon systems that serve best in a support role may be task organized to achieve the outer cordon's task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider are crew-served weapons, Javelin with the container launch unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman. Special teams to consider within the outer cordon include:

- Detainee security teams
- Interpreters/linguists
- Personnel search teams (including female Soldiers)
- Video teams
- Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
- Vehicle search teams
- Fire support team (FIST)

CONSIDERATIONS

Use of Doctrinal Tasks

The commander of the cordon and search element must carefully consider the doctrinal task assigned to the security/outer cordon element. The choice of task will likely be driven by what the search is oriented on, personnel, weapons, or equipment and the factors of METT-TC. It may also be driven by type and credibility of intelligence. Regardless, the task should support the purpose, and the purpose should be nested with that of the main effort. If the outer cordon element is to be a part of the search, then both the doctrinal task (interdict, for example) and special instructions should clearly indicate the commander's intent. If they are not to be part of the search and are only to prevent ingress/egress of personnel and vehicles (block, for example) then the task should be assigned accordingly.

Doctrinal Tasks Require Details

Detailed special instructions must be issued to the outer cordon element for executing searches of personnel and vehicles. The assigned task, purpose, and factors of METT-TC will drive many of the following considerations:

- Who and what is to be searched and to what level of detail?
- Under what circumstances are vehicles and personnel searched/detained?
- Under what circumstances are vehicles and personnel turned around and let go and is it different for traffic coming from inside the objective area versus traffic coming from the outside?
- What traffic, if any, is to be allowed to pass through the outer cordon?
    - What criteria must be met to allow this action?
    - Is it different for incoming and outgoing traffic?

In addition, consider the following:

- Who/what the search is oriented on and the credibility of the intelligence source or sources.
- The time of day the cordon and search is to be executed (vehicle and personnel traffic patterns/volume can drastically affect the ability of the outer cordon element to achieve their task and purpose).
- Any overall time constraints for the duration of the mission. (For example: If we start at a given time and take more than three hours, do we risk dealing with peak morning traffic?)

Often you must strike a balance between the thoroughness of the search, capability and limitations of the forces employed, and the degree of inconvenience to the local populace.

Emplacement Techniques and Timing

Another item to consider is the technique for emplacing the outer cordon. The outer cordon can be emplaced either simultaneously or sequentially. Choosing a method deserves careful consideration, and there are advantages and disadvantages to both techniques. Once you have determined what technique to use, ensure that your order of march (OOM) facilitates a smooth, synchronized execution. For example, if you are going to execute a sequential occupation, then the far side outer cordon elements should be first in OOM so they can pass through the objective and set in simultaneously with the near side outer cordon element(s). The far side outer cordon elements should be followed by the near side outer cordon elements, then the inner cordon element (if this is a separate element in the

task organization), followed by the search element, C2 node, reserve, and any combat service support (CSS) assets.

Simultaneous occupation facilitates maintaining the element of surprise and with rapid, synchronized emplacement of the inner cordon and search elements, maximizes the unit's ability to ensure that targeted individuals/materials do not escape the unit. Some of the disadvantages of simultaneous occupation are that it requires additional routes. Control measures/battle tracking (for example, phase lines or check points to ensure that the positions are emplaced simultaneously) makes control a little more difficult for the commander, potentially makes casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) more difficult and spreads out the units' combat power. It may also increase the probability of the outer cordon elements coming into contact with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or direct fire engagements.

Sequential emplacement of the outer cordon elements or using one route in and having outer cordon elements pass through the objective area is another technique. This technique facilitates C2, keeps combat power massed, facilitates CASEVAC, and requires less planning and the need for additional control measures and battle tracking to ensure synchronization. On the down side you are approaching the objective from one side of the objective, so if the enemy has an observer, the targeted individual(s) may be able to escape, hide, prepare a counterattack, or emplace an IED.

Specialized Equipment and Personnel

Special equipment needed to facilitate execution of the mission is vital to the rapid, thorough, and safe execution of personnel and vehicle searches. Special equipment items such as creepers, mirrors, flashlights, cameras, bullhorns, and bolt cutters are just a few examples. Consider employing signs in both Arabic and English to facilitate the operation. If your linguist support is limited, flash cards (with Arabic on one side and English on the other) with typical instructions for local personnel can be used to facilitate communication during execution of the mission.

POSITION SELECTION/FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection for the outer cordon element must be considered as well. The level of force protection for the outer cordon element will largely be determined by the task, purpose, and factors of METT-TC. The amount of Class IV needed for an element given the tactical task of block would likely be much greater than the amount needed for an element tasked to interdict.

When selecting actual positions for the outer cordon elements, you must consider many factors. One of the considerations is optimal positioning for providing security for the other elements considering avenues of approach mounted and dismounted. Try to mitigate the tactical risk of fratricide between the outer cordon and the other elements by putting distance, terrain, and/or man-made features between them.

SECURITY

All outer cordon elements must plan for and maintain 360-degree/three-dimensional security. Do not get fixated on what is happening outside of the outer cordon! Ensure that the plan includes weapons control status (when facing in and when facing out, if different), engagement criteria (consider what weapons systems should fire back in toward the inner cordon/search element), detailed control measures, direct fire control, and communications plans. Use rehearsals to refine and ensure thorough knowledge of all of the above and rehearse contingencies (seven [7] forms of contact). If the operation is to be executed in a military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) environment, it should be planned as a combat operation in MOUT.

METHODS

The Traffic Control Point (TCP)

One method of executing the outer cordon is the employment of TCPs. Subordinate elements use Class IV materials to construct a TCP to facilitate personnel and vehicle searches in accordance with (IAW) the cordon and search commander's intent. This method is used when at least some traffic will be allowed through. Construction of vehicle and personnel holding areas will aid in security and reduce the requirement for manpower. Ensure that 360-degree/three dimensional security is maintained especially when the TCP becomes busy. Position key leaders so that they can see the big picture, and do not let them get tied up in activities. Position key assets such as crew-served weapons and interpreters at the most critical locations. Be prepared to move leadership and key assets from one location to another if necessary. When executing searches, position vehicles and personnel to be searched so that the security element's sectors of fire face to the outside of the friendly element and away from non-combatants. Keep the bulk of your forces within the perimeter so that if the situation escalates your forces are essentially in a battle or support by fire position. Ensure that all personnel understand the direct fire plan and what the contingency plans are. For example:

- What are their actions in the event a vehicle penetrates their TCP from the outside?
- Who engages and with what weapons systems?
- When do they cease fire and what is the signal for that?
- Do crew-served weapons continue to engage or are they only to use M16s/M4s?

TCP Diagram



Figure 1

Above is a detailed sketch of a deliberate checkpoint (Figure 7-13, page 7-23, **FM 3-21.71,** ***Mechanized Platoon Operations***). Use your task, purpose, and the factors of METT-TC to determine what resources you need and how your TCP will be designed. Obviously you will not have the time or resources to build the ideal TCP, but this will give you an idea of how to design one.

The Blocking Position

Another method of executing the outer cordon is the blocking position. The blocking position does not allow for the passage of personnel or vehicular traffic. Consider the ramifications of not allowing any traffic through the outer cordon. This impact may be minimal when curfew is in effect, but could cause a riot if attempted when people are attempting to get to work. Consider that you may not achieve the element's purpose, if by failing to search vehicles, your element allows the targeted individual to pass the outer cordon once the blocking position is lifted.

The area will likely be too large to be covered entirely by blocking positions. The use of patrols, listening posts (LPs)/observation posts (OPs), and snipers or designated marksmen will help ensure the effectiveness of the outer cordon. If the blocking position is employed, ensure that all personnel know the routes and positions of these additional elements and that these elements are protected from friendly fire by graphic control measures and the use of terrain and/or man-made structures. Emplacement of crew-served weapons and sectors of fire are crucial to the direct fire plan. Consider the use of overt or covert employment of snipers. They can be used to provide observation of fleeing personnel and precision fires. Ensure that the snipers have adequate security, especially if they are employed in an overt manner.



Figure 2

The above sketch depicts an outer cordon element arrayed around an objective to block enemy or insurgent forces. The element employs a combination of blocking positions, an LP/OP, and a dismounted patrol to execute this mission.

CONCLUSION

It may seem a blinding flash of the obvious, but an outer cordon is not an independent operation. Rather it is an integral part of a larger coordinated operation: the cordon and search. Looked at one way, the outer cordon secures the operational area and in doing so fixes the enemy, stripping the initiative away from him. The outer cordon is the initial barrier to enemy reinforcements and the final barrier across his possible escape. The keys to success for the outer cordon are detailed planning, rehearsals at all levels, and maintaining situational awareness at all times; the success of the overall operation and preservation of Soldiers' lives depends on it.

Chapter 4

INNER CORDON

Captain Frank Baltazar, Task Force 1, JRTC Operations Group

The inner cordon protects the search element from threat activity such as direct fire, grenades, explosives, or civil disturbances and prevents escape from the immediate areas. Typical tactical tasks include overwatch, suppress, and secure. The inner cordon is the immediate reserve in the event of a civil disturbance. Because the inner cordon is closest to the search element, the inner cordon also observes and reports developments in its immediate area of interest.

The inner cordon is under the command and control (C2) of the cordon and search commander. The leader of the inner cordon must develop and maintain situational awareness concerning his area of responsibility, his assigned sectors of immediate tactical concern to the inner cordon, and the search element. He must also do the same for his area of interest that extends outward to the exterior or outer cordon.

Task Organization

Doctrinally, the inner cordon is not addressed. However, based on the tactical tasks, additional weapon systems that serve best in a support role may be task organized to facilitate the inner cordon's task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider are crew-served weapons, Javelin with the container launch unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman. Consider the following other special teams within the inner cordon:

- Snatch team
- Interpreters
- Personnel search team
- Video team
- Tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team (THT)

Consideration

If the cordon and search is focused on one building or requires sequential clearing, the entire search element will not be inside a building. Therefore, the search element may be able to accomplish some inner cordon responsibilities. For example, during an initial breach of the targeted building, the search element not inside conducting clearing or searching operations may provide some overwatch in a support by fire (SBF) position, monitoring the progress of the search. In another scenario, the uncommitted search elements can provide some protection from civilians on the battlefield (COB) or civil disturbances. In any case, the inner cordon must have a solid direct fire plan. Additionally, the inner cordon must be prepared to assist with civil disturbances if the search element commits.

The primary focus for planning should be for a combat operation in military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) which will maintain the unit's initiative if the situation escalates. When planning the emplacement of the inner cordon, the primary planning focus should be on a location where it supports the movement of the search element and isolates the target building. Alternate and/or successive SBF positions must be planned in the event the search element shifts focus to alternate buildings.

Leaders must determine the appropriate number of troops versus vehicles in the inner cordon. Things to consider are listed below:

- Population and probability of civil disturbances
- Searching a mosque versus a house (searching a mosque raises the probability of civil disturbances)
- Vehicles provide firepower and mobility, but they cannot talk to people or pacify crowds
- Vehicles require open roads to turn around and maneuver

Cordon and search commanders must determine the battle handover line between the search element and inner cordon as part of their direct fire plan. This will help determine when the inner cordon can engage when contact is made.

Methods



Figure 1

A method for the inner cordon requires security teams on each corner of the targeted building as displayed in Figure 1 above. The advantages of this method are that it prevents immediate infiltration or exfiltration of personnel and prevents COB from disrupting clearing or searching operations inside the targeted building. The disadvantages of this method are that it does not facilitate a direct fire plan and poses potential fratricide issues if the situation escalates. Depending on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations

(METT-TC), this method will not facilitate battle drill 6, if required. It minimizes the inner cordon's sectors of fire or area of responsibility (AOR). It also limits the inner cordon's ability to maintain situational awareness over its area of interest (AI).

Another method for the inner cordon is to establish SBF positions to isolate the targeted building. As an additional task, the inner cordon must be prepared to react to civil disturbances. The advantages of this method are it facilitates a direct fire plan and forces are prepared if the situation escalates. It provides the inner cordon a wider view of its AOR and its AI. The immediate disadvantage is that it may impede the inner cordon's reaction time to civil disturbances. However, as discussed earlier, the search element may be able to provide some control of civil disturbances until either the inner cordon or reserve elements are able to execute the task.



Figure 2

Looking Both Ways

Units may find themselves conducting a combination of the methods shown above depending on the situation. For example, the first method may be used by the uncommitted search elements while the actual inner cordon executes the second method. In any case, the inner cordon must look both ways to maintain situational awareness. The inner cordon with the search element, especially in the first method shown above, minimizes situational awareness to a central location. With the inner cordon in an SBF role, the threat area covered is broadened along with its ability to maintain situational awareness. But in either case, the inner cordon must look both ways, that is, maintain situational awareness on activities and actions inside the search area as well as activities and actions exterior to the inner cordon.

Observations/Trends/Trends Reversal

- Units fail to provide local security and as a result are surprised and lose the initiative on the objective.
- Units fail to plan for escalated situations and this failure results in an ineffective direct fire plan.

- Due to rules of engagement (ROE) constraints, units may want to consider weapon systems and their orientation.

- Most cordon and searches fail because of ineffective inner cordon planning. The inner cordon and search element must coordinate control measures prior to and while on the objective. Additionally, they must rehearse in order to be effective.

Chapter 5

SEARCH ELEMENT

Captain Frank Baltazar, Task Force 1, Joint Readiness Training Center

The search element is the main effort in the cordon and search. Typical tactical tasks include clear, seize, secure, or destroy.

TASK ORGANIZATION

There are two scenarios that may require a cordon and search: one focuses on an area and the other on a village.

If the cordon and search involves an area, then it takes on the task organization of movement to contact or attack. The task organization would include support, assault and breach, or reserve. For example, during a tactical movement, if a convoy makes contact with an improvised explosive device (IED), after the cordon is emplaced, a search team may receive a task to clear the surrounding area to destroy or seize enemy personnel.

The task organization of a search element is similar in military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT) or village situations. In a platoon attack of a building, the typical task organization is support, breach, and assault. In order to maintain the initiative, the search element should use the same task organization in the event the situation escalates.

FM 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain* provides a list of teams that may assist the company with the search. Special teams are assigned to certain elements within the search element:

- Entry/breach team
    - º Mine detection
    - º Interpreters
    - º Demolition team
    - º Local police
- Search team (personnel, vehicle, and female searchers)
    - º Tunnel reconnaissance
    - º Prisoner handlers/escort team
    - º Documentation teams (video if available)
    - º Scout dog team
    - º Local police

- Interpreters

- Support/support by fire (SBF) element (inner cordon)
  - Local police
  - Interpreters
- Command and control (C2)
- Civil affairs (CA)/psychological operations (PSYOP) augmentation team
  - Interrogation teams
  - Interpreters
  - Fire support team (FIST)

ENTRY METHODS

Based on intelligence, there are two methods of entry: knock approach and knock down approach. Both methods must be rehearsed.

- **Knock approach:** The approach to the target house should remain the same as battle drill 6. If no one answers the door, forced entry may be needed. The entry/clearing team must stack on the house, prepared to enter and clear the first room. The designated leader with interpreter knocks on the door and asks to speak with the head of the household. The designated leader negotiates the search and gives the head of the household clear instructions for actions to be taken by others in the house. Once the negotiations are complete, the entry team enters at a range walk pace, moving quickly through the fatal funnel, and securing its assigned corners. In order to maintain the initiative, clearing teams must overwhelm each room and be prepared to engage targets if presented. Do not haphazardly enter a room that has not been cleared.

- **Knock down approach:** If the situation requires a knock down approach, a platoon must execute battle drill 6 and entry/clearing teams must execute battle drill 6A. Plan and prepare for different types of breaches (battering ram or demolition team with silhouette charges).

SEARCH METHODS

According to FM 3-06.11, there are three basic search methods in populated areas. Depending on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) variations or combinations of these methods may be used:

- **Central location**: If inhabitants appear hostile, assemble them in a central location. This method provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies the belligerents an opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. It has the disadvantage of taking the inhabitants away from their dwellings, thus encouraging looting and possibly engendering further ill feelings.

- **Home restriction:** Restrict the inhabitants to their homes. This prohibits movement of civilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence in their homes.

- **Control heads of households:** The head of each household is told to remain in the front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a central location. During the search, the head of the household can see that the search team will steal nothing. Often, this is the best method for controlling the populace during a search. This head of the household can be used to open doors and containers to facilitate the search.

CLEAR/SEARCH THE BUILDING

The search element determines the method of clearing (simultaneous or systematic) based on the factors of METT-TC. Systematic clearing facilitates controlling the head of the household. Using this method allows the head of the household to see that the clearing team steals nothing and he/she can open doors and closets to facilitate the search. Prior to executing the search, the building must be cleared and secured.

The search element clears the building in accordance with (IAW) **ARTEP 7-8, *Drill***, battle drill 6, "Enter and clear a building (platoon)" and battle drill 6A, "Enter a building and clear a room (squad)." As the squad progresses through the building, clearing teams mark each room IAW their unit tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP). This facilitates situational awareness for the inner cordon and shifts SBF personnel overwatching the search element. Civilians on the battlefield (COB) found throughout the building must be escorted and consolidated in a central location. Do not leave unguarded personnel in rooms; consolidate civilians in the first room searched to facilitate screening by a search team.

Once the building is cleared, clearing teams may accomplish their additional tasks or occupy security/secondary SBF positions while search teams conduct the search. Their primary focus should be security.

Conduct of the Search

Search teams enter the house and move directly to the COB collection point. A local police officer (if available), interpreter, and personnel search team accompany a designated leader and begin screening individuals. Another designated search team begins searching the remainder of the house with the head of the household. Special teams such as a documentation team, dog

teams, or CA/PSYOP may be called forward in order to assist with the search.

Leaders must also train their Soldiers in tactical questioning techniques. More formal interrogation teams may not be available or may be overwhelmed. Experiences from current operations document those units using immediate tactical questioning techniques are often the most important source for actionable intelligence. Also units should review procedures on handling civilians in temporary detainment. Where possible, detainees should not be allowed to talk to one another until they are screened. In circumstances where suspicious activity is detected, video taping the area and the personnel involved can be crucial. All central holding areas should be videotaped for later exploitation. Likewise, videotaping a knock approach entry documents the operation for similar exploitation.

Units should develop systematic room searching techniques in order to prevent overlooking an area. The search (room) team consists of a minimum of three personnel: one person to move/open furniture or doors if the head of household is not available; one person to observe (booby traps, contraband, personnel, etc.) and prepared to engage targets if presented; and one person to record.

Room searches have a three dimensional (3D) focus. They should not be limited to the immediate furniture or doors in the room but also trap doors, ceilings, etc.

Winning Hearts and Minds

“At the end of the day you don’t defeat an insurgency solely with military forces. You’ve got to capture or kill the bad guys, but you win by getting the people to believe they have a stake in the success of the New Iraq."

Major General David Patraeus

Once the search is complete, ensure that everything in the house is repositioned to its original setting to improve attitudes and relationships. Impart the unit information operation (IO) theme with the head of the household or other key leaders in the town.

Observations/Trends/Trends Reversal

- The search element is unprepared to execute battle drill 6 and 6A. Due to the unpredictable environment, units must plan and rehearse making contact upon initial entry. This will prevent confusion on the objective and fratricide. Rehearse the escalation and de-escalation of force and the rules of engagement (ROE).

- There is no clear task organization within the search element. Soldiers or fire teams are tasked on the move to execute personnel search. Units should designate special teams and rehearse them as part of actions on the objective.

- Units fail to plan follow-on actions if there is negative contact or nothing is found. They tend to roam around the objective in hopes of finding something. This causes a negative impact on the civilian population and increases the probability of taking friendly casualties. If this occurs, possibly reconsider the quality of your source(s).

- Units are planning movement to the objective and actions on the objective. Do not leave out the exfiltration plan.

- Rehearse actions on the objective (approach to the target house, breach methods, negotiation with head of household, clearing and searching operations, evacuation of targeted personnel/equipment, crowd control, 7 forms of contact, and casualty evacuation [CASEVAC]). Rehearse movement to the objective and exfiltration. Bottom line: REHEARSE, REHEARSE, REHEARSE. (See Appendix D.)

Chapter 6

THE RESERVE

Captain Adam Carson and Captain Jason Tussey, Task Force 1, JRTC Operations Group

Every leader is taught from the earliest possible moment to maintain a reserve appropriate to his mission and unit strength. A cordon and search operation is no different; however, as is the case with all military missions, certain trends have emerged regarding formation, mission, and execution of the reserve in cordon and search operations.

TRENDS

The three main problem areas for most reserves begin with mission planning:

- First, units fail to clearly identify priority of tasks for the reserve. Accordingly, the reserve fails to rehearse the correct tasks.
- Second, the reserve element fails to coordinate with the main effort and other units during mission planning. As a result, the reserve has poor situational awareness during the entire operation.
- Third, the commander does not give the reserve clear commitment criteria. The reserve, therefore, cannot anticipate its commitment to the operation and is slow to react.

MISSION OF THE RESERVE

The purpose of the reserve is to be prepared to reinforce and/or accomplish the task and purpose of the unit's main effort. In addition, the commander may task the reserve to accomplish both the specified and implied tasks he sets during the planning, execution, and consolidation/reorganization of the mission. That means that the reserve leader must be intimately familiar with all aspects of the mission from its inception through its completion.

COMMAND OF THE RESERVE

The reserve is under the command and control (C2) of the cordon and search commander. The reserve leader must coordinate with the commander to determine the mission essential tasks to be planned and rehearsed. He must then coordinate with the main effort leader to understand the concept of the operation and identify a tentative event or time to commit the reserve. Neither the reserve leader nor the main effort leader can commit the reserve. Everyone in the unit must understand that only the commander can commit the reserve.

TASK ORGANIZATION

Doctrinally, a company is the reserve for a brigade, a platoon is the reserve for a battalion, and a squad is the reserve for a company. However, based on the unit's task and purpose, commanders may determine through mission

analysis that a larger or smaller reserve is required. The combat power of the reserve must be in accordance with their task organization, and the reserve must have all major equipment and personnel to accomplish the task or tasks assigned by the commander.

The reserve element is attached to the headquarters element during the operation and upon commitment from the commander will be under tactical control of the receiving unit, normally the main effort. It is important for the reserve leader to understand whom he will report to, when that time will be, and where he needs to maneuver his force.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The reserve must be positioned to weight the main effort to properly exploit success, reinforce or maintain momentum, facilitate destruction of enemy counterattacks, and/or provide local security for a cordon and search mission. The preceding list of tasks indicates the position of the reserve is paramount to the success of the unit. The commander must identify, through mission analysis and on the ground situational awareness, where the reserve needs to be located and when to maneuver the element to a different position.

The commander must identify the tasks the reserve may be committed to execute. These tasks must be prioritized and given to the reserve leader so he can plan and rehearse these actions in accordance with the commander's plan. Probable tasks assigned to the reserve during a cordon and search mission include, but are not limited to the following:

- Reinforce inner cordon
- Clear buildings
- Search buildings
- Secure, safeguard, and escort civilians or detainees
- Block enemy escape routes

Imperative to the entire reserve integration is the commitment criteria the commander uses to identify when the reserve is needed. Commitment criteria are developed by the commander during mission analysis and disseminated to subordinate leaders. Subordinate leaders and, more importantly, the reserve leader then battle track the operation and anticipate committing the reserves to the operation. All commitment criteria need not be met for the reserve to be committed, but there must be a plan on when to commit the reserve to the fight. Possible commitment criteria are as follows:

- Hostile crowd forming around inner cordon
- Loss of **main effort** squad
- Numerous rooms in building being searched

- More than five detainees
- Enemy engages inner cordon

CONCLUSIONS

Formation and use of a reserve force is standard fare in military operations and like all other military missions, the overall cordon and search commander must set up his reserve leader for success through careful mission analysis and planning. The wise commander selects a capable reserve leader; the ultimate success of the entire operation may depend on that single reserve leader executing the right mission at the right time in the right way.

Chapter 7

FLIGHT OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Jennings

"Adapt, Migrate or Die" – Charles Darwin

The following tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and lessons learned are important factors for commanders to consider when planning and executing aviation operations in Southwest Asia (SWA). These TTP are taken from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) database on recent operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and from lessons learned from our allies. The primary doctrinal references used are **FM 3-06,** ***Aviation Urban Operations;*** **FM 3-06.11,** ***Combined Armed Operations in Urban Terrain;*** **FM 1-111,** ***Aviation Brigade;*** **FM 1-112,** ***Attack Helicopter Battalion;*** **FM 1-114,** ***Air Cavalry Squadron and Troop Operations;*** and **FM 17-95,** ***Cavalry Operations.*** U.S. soldiers can use these lessons learned to successfully plan and execute the full spectrum of aviation missions.

A. Characteristics of Aviation Urban Operations

- Urban areas are directly affected by weather, especially wind patterns.
- The numerous buildings and streets and few map references complicate navigation over built-up areas. Flight routes over urban terrain may increase employment time and fuel consumption.
- Buildings limit maneuverability and engagement ranges.
- Urbanized terrain may limit forward arming and refueling point (FARP) size, location, and response times.
- Extensive urban sprawl and high buildings degrade communications and may require extensive relay and retransmission sites.
- Urbanized terrain masks intelligence and electronic warfare acquisition capabilities.
- Landing and pickup zones may be severely limited; operations from rooftops may be required.
- Aviation units face increased hazards to flight operations: towers, wires, and antenna hazards.
- Night-vision system degradation due to city lights and thermal imagery create challenges in the city.

- There is a high risk to aircraft from close-range, small-arms fires, complicated by the close proximity of both friendly forces and non-combatants.

- There is the possibility of degraded visibility and toxic fumes when flying near or through smoke and dust.

B. "Rules to Live By" for Aviation in Urban Operations

- **Avoid urban areas.** Operate in urban areas only when the mission dictates it. If the mission dictates operations in urban areas, have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the key terrain (e.g., intersections, roads, hospitals, schools, cultural, religious, and municipal buildings), flight routes in and out of the area of operations (AO), and flight hazards (e.g., towers, wires, canals, and power lines).

- **Get in and out quickly.** Minimize the time spent over urbanized terrain. Ingress and egress the area by different routes that minimize the duration of flight over urbanized terrain. Fly at medium to higher airspeeds, depending on altitude and hazards, to decrease the opportunity for engagement by ground weapons.

- **Do not be predictable.** Use alternate flight routes and checkpoints. Plan egress and contingency routes, rally procedures, and backup navigation techniques. Vary your times.

- **Minimize your signature.** Take maximum advantage of flight profile options and existing conditions to lessen the risk of acquisition and engagement. Plan and execute the mission with maximum emphasis on aircraft signature reduction.

- **Know the current situation.** Insist on the most current information available regarding friendly forces, the enemy, and hazards. Update information prior to takeoff, en route to the objective, and continuously during the mission.

- **Establish communications with all players.** Determine net information for all participating and supporting elements. Establish communications with ground maneuver elements as soon as possible en route to the objective.

- **Think before you shoot.** To minimize fratricide develop a clear understanding of the friendly situation before you engage targets. Ensure that the identify friend and foe (IFF) and aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) is working, and know the purpose and demarcation lines for IFF and ASE.

TECHNIQUE: Once the ADA threat is suppressed, fly at higher altitudes to avoid small arms fire. Use a methodical approach to urban areas and do not fly over the city until friendly ground forces have swept it.[1]

C. Aviation Route Planning and Navigation

- Navigation in the city can be overwhelming because of the over abundance of visual cues.
- Use vertical and linear references to distinguish en route checkpoints. Radio towers, tall buildings, or unique city features (parks, malls) can assist the aircrew with their navigation. Linear cues, such as roads, highways, and rivers through a city can also assist the crews with navigation.
- Obtain maps with the proper information for both navigation and synchronization with the ground maneuver elements. (Photo maps of the village/town/city are great tools.)
- Use an area sketch for target areas or objectives. The area sketch simply identifies the natural and man-made features in the area and codes them with letters, numbers, or code words. Identification of both targets and friendly unit location is much easier with both air and ground units using the same area sketch.
- Convert civilian maps to the military grid reference system (MGRS). Civilian maps also include the names of streets and key buildings, locations, and terrain within the city.
- Navigation in the city is also affected by the abundance of lights in urban areas that degrade night-vision devices. Develop a system of routes that follow easily identifiable features.
- Familiar landmarks may disappear, become covered with rubble, or be obscured by smoke and dust during the fight.
- Use the “spider web” concept to construct a route structure throughout an urban area. Air control points (ACP) are placed on easily identifiable features and then linked together to form the route. The "spider web" concept provides for many different routes and variations of routes using established checkpoints. This ability to vary routes adds unpredictability to flight missions.



D. Landing Zone (LZ)/Pickup Zone (PZ) and Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) Selection in an Urban Environment

- Aviation planners must look at all available products to find suitable sites for LZs, PZs, and FARPs.
- City maps, overhead imagery, and even reconnaissance flights will help the unit select proper sites.
- Consider the use of city parks, parking lots, stadium fields, and athletic fields.
- Major highways and large multilane roads offer potential LZ, PZ, and FARP sites, if civilian traffic is not using them.
- Lighting at the LZ is a factor. If the city is not blacked out, city lights will affect the night-vision goggles used by the pilots. If the LZ is large or has multiple turns, consider using pathfinders or air traffic services to control the PZ or LZ.
- Antennas, light poles, debris, wires, and enemy locations are hazards at military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) landing sites.

- Winds may change direction because of buildings and built-up areas. Tall buildings may funnel winds through the streets, causing a much higher wind condition than briefed.

E. Aviation Direct Fire Planning Considerations and Techniques

- Urban terrain is severely canalized which causes severely limited fields of fire.
- Streets limit target views to a narrow corridor along the street or from high angles over buildings.
- Expect enemy forces to utilize the near sides of buildings, putting them out of view.
- Expect targets to move rapidly from cover to cover and require quick engagement.
- Direct fires are provided from battle positions (BP), attack-by-fire positions (ABF), or support-by-fire positions (SBF).
- The threat to aircraft is lessened when firing from the friendly side of the battlefield.
- When forced to fight and fly over areas where the enemy has not been cleared, it is better to keep the aircraft moving and make it a harder target to hit.
- Consider conducting running fire engagements from an initial point (IP), engaging the target, and returning to a safe area to regroup for another attack. The lead wingman concept, where the wingman can suppress the target after the lead man's engagement and "cover his break," is excellent for this type of attack. During a running fire engagement, aircrews must prevent overflight of friendly units.
- Coordination is required with ground units to suppress the enemy's fire to protect the aircraft during their attack. The 30-mm on the AH-64, .50 cal on the OH-58D, and the 2.75-inch rockets fired by both aircraft are ideal for this attack.
- Precision-guided weapons, such as the Hellfire missile, can be used in congested urban terrain; however, their capabilities are limited. Aircrews can expect short-range Hellfire engagements and may have to reposition many times and seek out the best angle for attack.
- Hovering fire allows aircrews to unmask both laterally and vertically from behind cover, but is not recommended in urbanized terrain because aircrews must maneuver within 2,000 meters to get "eyes on" the target.

Spider Web Route Structure



Hovering Fire Engagement **Running Fire Engagement**

- The urban targeting grid system is a technique that divides up the urban area into specific grid sectors. A number or letter identifies each building. Coding the corners of the buildings facilitates rapid fires.

- The target handover to the aircrew is simply the location from the grid system and a brief target description.

- Both the aircrew and the ground unit must have the same urban targeting grid for effective coordination to occur.



- The bull's-eye targeting technique gives the aircrew a specific point and reference target location from that point. The bull's-eye must be a point that is easily recognizable for both the unit in contact and the aircrew flying the attack mission. The bull's-eye may be preplanned or given to the aircrew on site. As long as the aircrew and the ground unit are working from the same map or both are familiar with the area, bull's-eye targeting is very

effective. The target handover to the aircrew is simply a distance and direction from the bull's-eye and a target description.



- Target reference points (TRPs) are tools that both air and ground units can use to coordinate fires. TRPs are easily recognized points on the ground (either natural or man-made) used to initiate, distribute, and control fires. TRPs are designated by maneuver leaders to define sectors of fire or observation. TRPs can also designate the center of an area where the commander plans to converge or distribute the fires of his weapons rapidly. The target handover is similar to bull's-eye targeting: a distance and direction from the TRP and a brief target description.



F. Aviation Weapons Effects

- Urban targets are usually hard, smooth, and contain flat surfaces. Rounds fired from the air strike the surface at an angle and tend to ricochet, causing impact-fused weapons not to detonate.

- Targets rarely present themselves for extended periods of time. Aircrews can expect short target exposure and rapid engagements. Aircrews must be constantly on the lookout for targets and be ready to engage rapidly. Expect enemy-held structures to be covered by fire.

- Expect dead space within urban areas. Large, tall buildings and narrow streets create dead space that aircrews cannot engage.

- If enemy units are in buildings, the buildings must be attacked first to get to the enemy soldiers inside. Weapons that can break through walls must be used.

- Weapons found on attack aircraft designed to destroy vehicular targets and troops in the open are also effective in the urban environment.

- TOW, Hellfire, and 2.75-inch rockets produce effects on structures found in the city.

- Precision-guided munitions, tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided weapon (TOW) and Hellfire, give the aircrew the ability to target specific windows, floors, or sections of a building.

- Rockets produce effects on structures and are also effective on troops in open streets.

- HE rockets produce the best effects on buildings.

- Smoke rockets are used to mask friendly movement.

- Flechette rockets are ideal for clearing rooftops or attacking troops in the open.

- The gun systems on attack aircraft are also effective when used to clear rooftops and troops in the open or fired on the front of buildings and into windows.

TECHNIQUE: AH-64 chain gun (30-mm): Use manual ranges of 300 meters in the city and 800-1,000 meters in open terrain.[2]

(**Note:** Consult the ***Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual*** for information regarding the effect of weapons on targets.)

G. Operational Phases

Urban operations doctrine has divided a deliberate attack on a city into five distinct phases: (1) reconnoiter the objective, (2) move to the objective, (3) isolate the objective, (4) secure a foothold, and (5) clear the objective. Aviation units (attack battalions, cavalry squadrons, and assault battalions) can expect missions during each phase of the attack. Aviation units conducting direct fire in urban terrain will find it differs greatly from open terrain. In open terrain, attack and cavalry aircraft can engage at maximum ranges, while engagements in urban terrain are usually at close range and in close proximity to friendly units.

- **Phase I: Reconnoiter the Objective**
    - Aviation units assist the ground unit commander in a thorough route, area, and zone reconnaissance of the objective to complete the attack plan.
    - Conduct route reconnaissance of the routes leading to and from the urban area (both ground and air).
    - Conduct zone reconnaissance of the areas around the city.
    - Conduct area reconnaissance of key terrain or areas leading to the city.
    - Conduct hasty attacks on enemy units found during this phase of the operation.
    - Provide security during insertion for scout and long-range surveillance teams.
    - Support insertion of ground scouts; insert low-level voice intercept (LLVI) teams, ground sensors, and ground surveillance radar teams.
- **Phase II: Move to the Objective**
    - Continue aerial reconnaissance operations to detect enemy forces, positions, and obstacles and prevent them from interfering with the attack plan.
    - Support air assaults with area reconnaissance of air route and landing zones (LZs)/pickup zones (PZs).
    - Conduct a screen of a moving force as the ground units move along their attack routes into the urban area.
    - Conduct a force-oriented zone reconnaissance to locate and defeat enemy forces along the route or in areas that can influence the ground scheme of maneuver.
    - Continue to identify routes or confirm that previously cleared routes are still free of obstacles.

- Conduct hasty attacks on enemy units and positions.
- Support repositioning of ground forces to assault positions.
- Support movement of supplies by air.
- Continue to insert and reposition ground scouts.
- Deploy Volcano minefields to fix forces.
- Conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and combat search and rescue (CSAR).
- Conduct command and control (C2) missions.

- **Phase III: Isolate the Objective**
  - Isolate the objective to prevent the enemy from escaping or reinforcing the urban area.
  - Conduct screens to provide early warning of incoming enemy forces that are attempting to reinforce the city.
  - Help develop the situation.
  - Destroy enemy forces.
  - Assist with battle handovers.
- **Phase IV: Secure a Foothold**
  - Securing a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides cover from enemy fire and a place for attacking troops to enter the built-up area.
  - Conduct area reconnaissance to determine possible enemy forces, weak points, flanks, and enemy composition.
  - Mass aviation fires to assist ground units with establishing a foothold.
  - Conduct area security, reconnaissance, or other security missions to maintain the isolation of the urban area.
  - Provide suppressive fires from ABF, SBF, or BP.
  - Employ precision fires to destroy enemy armor on high-speed avenues of approach into the city.
  - Coordinate with joint air attack teams (JAAT) to destroy armored forces securing the breech point.
  - Provide laser identification of targets.

- Provide security for assault units that transport ground forces to the area.
- Continue to conduct reconnaissance, security, and hasty attacks to maintain the isolation of the city.

- **Phase V: Clear a Built-up Area**
  - Clearing a built-up area is characterized by systematic house-to-house fighting as ground forces attempt to force the enemy from the city.
  - Continue isolation of the city operations.
  - Conduct reconnaissance and security operations in the city in support of the ground units in contact.
  - Air operations in the city are best performed by small units/lead wingman teams.
  - Aviation units that assist ground units in contact must have an understanding of the weapons system's effectiveness against urban targets.
  - Units in contact must accurately mark their location and the target's location during both day and night conditions.
  - Screen outside the city to prevent reinforcements from arriving or the enemy from resupplying the city.
  - Conduct reconnaissance within the city that supports assault units, repositioning forces, or forces conducting aerial resupply.
  - Conduct deliberate and hasty attack missions under control of the unit in contact. It is critical that the attack units have communications with the unit in contact.
  - Conduct resupply operations and air movement of troops.
  - Expect LZs in large parking lots, city parks, athletic fields, and even on buildings.
  - Support air assault operations to clear pockets of resistance throughout the city.
  - Support CASEVAC and CSAR missions.

H. Close Combat Attack (CCA) Technique

Close combat attack is defined as a hasty or deliberate attack in support of ground units engaged in close combat. During CCA, armed helicopters engage enemy units with direct fire that impact near friendly forces. Targets

may range from a few hundred meters to a few thousand meters. CCA is coordinated and directed by team-, platoon- or company-level ground unit soldiers.[3]

- As enemy elements seize key features (particularly vertical structures), the air defense threat escalates within the urban area.
- CCA is a procedure that is very similar to running or diving fire and ensures aviation fires destroy the enemy with minimal risk to friendly forces.
- The CCA technique allows aviation attack teams of two or three OH-58Ds or AH-64s to engage targets with a greater degree of accuracy and protection than they could with hover fire.
- CCA requires ground and aviation leaders to positively identify the target and coordinate the attack timing and direction.
- The aircrews fly at nap-of-the-earth (NOE) altitudes at airspeeds of 80-100 knots.
- Approximately 300-1,000 meters out from the target, the aircrews execute a cyclic climb to an altitude of 100-300 feet.
- At the specified altitude (threat/terrain dependent), the aircraft is "nosed over," and the aircrews immediately engage the target with 2.75-inch rockets or machine guns.
- After employing their weapon systems, the aircrews break left, break right, or fly straight ahead.
    - º Breaking left or right exposes the larger side profile of the airframe to enemy fire.
    - º Flying straight ahead exposes the crew and aircraft to the effects of the ordnance they just fired, or they may overfly previously undetected enemy forces.
    - º Depending on the tactical situation, it is best for the aircraft to break hard to one side and return to NOE flight immediately.
- The fires from the second helicopter as it begins its firing run aids the first helicopter's egress from the target area by forcing the enemy to keep their heads down.

Close Combat Attack



I. Air-Ground Coordination Techniques

- The key to success for enhancing air-ground coordination and the subsequent execution of the tasks is a standing operating procedure (SOP) between air and ground maneuver units that addresses hasty attacks in a close combat situation.
- Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with the ground element.
- Plan for and expect minimal planning time.
- Initial information provided should be sufficient to get the aviation team out of its own assembly area.
- A holding area is located in the sector of the ground unit involved in close combat.
- Designate alternate holding areas, along with ingress and egress routes, if occupation is expected to last longer than 15 minutes.
- En route to the holding area, the aviation team leader contacts the ground unit to verify the location of the holding area, update information on enemy and friendly, and conduct additional coordination.
- Coordination and communication begins with the requesting unit command post (CP) and ends with the leader of the lowest level unit in contact.

- The aviation team leader provides the infantry unit leader with the team's present location, estimated time of arrival (ETA), the composition of the attack team, the armament load and weapons configuration, and total station time.
- The infantry unit leader, in turn, provides the attack team leader with:
    - His maneuver plan
    - Updates on enemy composition and disposition
    - Location of his forces and supporting artillery or mortar positions
    - Most recent activities
    - Location of known air defense weapons
    - Update on the friendly situation
    - Method for marking friendly positions
- The infantry unit leader provides a description of the target.
- The infantry unit leader provides a location of the target using geographical terrain features and smoke rounds from artillery or mortars already impacting on the target area, illumination or tracer rounds, or other ground fires to provide a reference mark on the target.
- The attack team leader then informs the infantry unit leader of the BP, ABF position, or the series of positions his team will occupy that provides the best observation and fields of fire into the engagement or target area.
- The BP or ABF position is a position from which the attack aircraft will engage the enemy with direct fire.
- The BP or ABF position is normally offset from the flank of the friendly ground position to ensure that rotor wash, ammunition casing expenditure, and the general signature of the aircraft does not interfere with operations on the ground.
- The attack team leader then provides the infantry unit leader with his concept for the team's attack on the objective.
- Only on completion of coordination with the lowest unit in contact does the flight depart the holding area for the BP.
- As the attack team moves out of the holding area, it uses NOE flight to mask itself from ground enemy observation and enemy direct-fire systems.

- The attack team leader maintains communications with the infantry unit leader while he maintains internal communications on either his very high frequency (VHF) or ultra-high frequency (UHF) net.

J. Marking Targets and Friendly Positions in Urban Combat

- Aircrews require positive identification of the target and friendly positions prior to releasing ordnance.
- The methods to mark friendly and enemy positions are limited only by the creativity of the ground forces and aircrews.
- Methods and techniques employed must be adapted to the conditions prevalent at the time.
- Some proven techniques for signaling or marking friendly positions include:
    - Spray paint or bed sheets hung out of windows
    - Traditional but simple signaling devices, such as flares, strobes, and signaling mirrors
    - Use of glint tape, combat identification panels (CIPs), and infrared beacons
- Some proven techniques for target marking or orientation on enemy positions include the use of smoke grenades, laser pointers, tracers, or smoke from indirect fires.
- Fixed-wing gun ships and rotary-wing aircraft should expect detailed continuing directions, including reference points to the target, in addition to standard range and bearing.
- Aircrews and terminal guidance controllers must become familiar with the roof outline of buildings. Flat roofs, pitched roofs, domed roofs, and roofs with towers or air conditioning units on top will aid in acquisition, visually and thermally.

K. Aircrew Urban Threat Considerations

- Every building and structure in an urban area is a potential enemy position.
- The presence of snipers increases the vulnerability to ambush.
- The difficulty in distinguishing combatants from non-combatants places participants under additional psychological stress.
- The defending force normally has the advantage of familiarity with the terrain.

- Aircraft are more vulnerable to low-tech weapons in urban combat.

- Urban terrain provides excellent cover and concealment for a variety of weapon systems. Coupled with the restrictions on airspace available for maneuver, this makes these weapons a more significant threat to aircraft than they normally are in open terrain. Some of these weapons include:

    - **Tank main gun:** Modern fire control systems permit effective aircraft engagement by tanks with their main gun. The development of effective anti-helicopter ammunition, such as the U.S.-fielded multi-purpose anti-tank (MPAT) round includes an air/ground fuse.

    - **Antitank guided munitions (ATGM):** Most ATGM have an effective range of between 3,000 and 5,000 meters and can engage helicopters in the same way they engage ground targets. ATGM are a threat to rotary-wing aircraft in an urban environment due to the restriction and compression of airspace and proximity to potential threat positions.

    - **Antiarmor rockets:** Antiarmor rockets, such as the light anti-tank weapon (LAW), AT-4, and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) are readily available, inexpensive, and normally standard equipment at the small unit level, even in irregular forces. They are unguided, have effective ranges of less than 500 meters, and are a real threat to rotary-wing aircraft.

    - **Medium cannons:** Many armored personnel carriers (ATC) and infantry fighting vehicles (ITV) carry rapid-fire cannons ranging from 20-mm through 40-mm that are effective against rotary-wing aircraft.

    - **Small arms and machine guns:** Small arms and machine guns can also become a more significant threat in an urban environment. Generally, 5.56-mm and 7.62x39-mm rifles are effective out to 500 meters, 7.62-mm machine guns and sniper rifles of similar caliber are effective to 1,000 meters, and .50-cal/12.7-mm machine guns and sniper rifles are effective to 2,000 meters. Another consideration is that these weapons can be placed on the upper floors of buildings above the helicopters to fire down on the helicopters. Since these are small, light weapons, they can be easily moved to unexpected positions easily.

L. Reconnaissance Operations

Southwest Asia's varying terrain poses several challenges for aircrews conducting reconnaissance missions. There are a wide variety of small villages/towns and named areas of interest (NAI) in flat areas as well as

nestled on a hill or arrayed on both sides of a valley. These areas make a clear field of view (FOV) for observation very difficult and sometimes unavailable without having an aircraft fly right up to or over the reconnaissance objective.

- **Recommended employment technique for OH-58D aircraft (urban area with mountainous terrain).** In order to gain the valuable observation of the target area or to confirm or deny activity in the urban area, it may be necessary to utilize the following:

    - **The Aviation Mission Planning Station (AMPS) of Falcon View.** Use AMPS to check the line of sight (LOS) from a vantage point close enough to the reconnaissance objective without compromising security for the aerial weapons team (AET).

    - **Overlapping FOs.** Overlap the FOV of the AETs from different angles to the target. By choosing a series of observation posts (OPs) surrounding the objective area, the AET will be able to cover two of the cardinal directions while still providing security to the other aircraft if needed. Keep movement between the lead and wing aircraft to provide total observation and gain situational awareness. It may become necessary to place the lead aircraft at a vantage point higher than the target to see the topside, and the wing aircraft at the bottom side of the target in order to gain observation of the entire target.

    - **Obstacle FOV.** Conducting the technical map reconnaissance, in conjunction with the AMPS LOS, is a proven method to gain observation from the planning phase. The only caution to gaining the best vantage point to the objective is taking into account the vegetation and man-made structures that become a hindrance to LOS. There are times the best FOV is accomplished by checking the rise-over-the-run and keeping the AET high enough to maintain the observation. At times it may be prudent to be deceptive and maintain a constant flight path past the objective area with the attitude to the aircraft flying abeam the target employing the azimuth of the mast-mounted sight (MMS) on the target. This technique works well in restrictive terrain locations, spurs, and in valleys where the only observation may be right over the target because the FOV is obstructed by natural or man-made obstacles.

    - **Keep constant movement between the AETS.** This allows the team to gain situational awareness of the entire reconnaissance area. The natural response of people is to look up to the high ground when they hear the audible sound of an aircraft. Employing one aircraft on the high ground and drawing the attention of the villagers provides the lower aircraft the opportunity to gain observation and

movement in and around the objective without drawing attention to itself and still be in position to support when required. Employ the "fly-by" reconnaissance in locations where OPs do not provide the best observation.

- 2. **Recommended employment technique for OH-58D (urban area with flat terrain).** To gain the observation of the target area in this type of environment it may be necessary to employ the following:

    - **Maintain a constant orbit around the objective.** This technique provides the AET 360-degree observation and affords LOS on different axis of view in and out of the reconnaissance area. The distance between the lead and wing aircraft may vary depending upon the size of the area, but as the lead aircraft is conducting a turn looking down a road, alley, or linear area, the wing aircraft can support/backup the FOV from the reverse side. It becomes critical to employ the on-board systems and MMS to augment the visual cues the aircrew employs to acquire targets. This technique assists in reducing the dead space/unobserved areas the lead aircraft may not be able to view after passing a location on the ground. It is still the wing aircraft's responsibility to "follow and support" with suppressive fires or observation at a distance to the lead aircraft with enough reaction time to influence a situation.

    - **Alternating a right or left orbit around the objective.** When the standoff distance is greater than 1,500 meters or so, conduct a left orbit around the reconnaissance area. The copilot observer employs the MMS to search the area in different FOS and provides reconnaissance information on the objective area with the use of the onboard systems at a standoff distance. When the reconnaissance requires the AET to move in closer in order to gain a more detailed picture or support a ground element, change the rotation around the target to a right orbit. This technique allows the aviator in the right seat to have observation on targets at a closer range to employ suppressive fires quickly and to guide ground elements onto a target. Cross talk between the aircrew is important to delineate between what targets are primary and alternate, but the employment of suppressive fires and direct movement for the ground forces at this point becomes largely the responsibility of the right seater.

    - **Conduct observation at a higher vantage point and slower airspeeds.** Recognizing the obstacles of an urban flat area and the built-up features that obstruct an FOV, the AET has to adapt to the obstructions and gain observation by flying at a higher altitude above the ground and operate at slower airspeeds. Employing these two techniques allows the AET to view the ground floor of buildings,

roads, or open areas that would be obstructed by some other natural or man-made obstacle. A small row of roadside trees or a two- or three-story building is an obstruction when attempting to gain observation on a location where activity may occur. By increasing the flight path above ground level (AGL), the AET now has an advantage over unobserved locations. Increasing the AGL

moving the laser hit spot just in front of the ground element as they continue to move.

Use positive verbiage or terms to identify movement to the ground element. Even when a laser spot is seen on a target, all references need to be in cardinal directions for ease of guidance. When giving a clock direction or a variant to a clock direction for guiding techniques to the ground forces, it is imperative to call all movements off the ground element and not the attitude of the aircraft. This is very important when calling directions in an urban environment and can be employed by calling a direction and a certain number of houses/buildings from the ground elements position to a target location.[4]

N. Video Reconnaissance. Video reconnaissance is an important aspect of intelligence gathering. The technique described in the following "Video Reconnaissance Checklist" uses AH-64 aircraft “switch” terminology; however, the basic principles apply to all aircraft with video recording capability.

Endnotes:

1. Information derived from SWA Science and Technology Assessment Team Report, 1 May 03.

2. Information derived from SWA Science and Technology Assessment Report, 29 Apr 03.

3. Information derived from power point slide presentation, “Aviation in Close Combat,” TRADOC, Aviation Doctrine collaborative site, Army Knowledge Center.

4. Information derived from Kosovo Lessons Learned, submitted by Major Brian Serota, 26 Mar 00.

5. Information derived from KFOR Aviation Task Force SOP, Mar 01.

Video Reconnaissance Checklist

1. **Actions Prior to Mission:**

- Know commander's intent; why are you conducting the recon?
- Copy all friendly graphics that are in the recon area.
- Conduct a thorough map recon:
  - Select ingress and egress flight routes.
  - Select observation points.
  - Identify LZs, known or suspected enemy locations, high-speed avenues of approach (AAs), key terrain, and potential obstacles in recon area.
- Assign primary and alternate video missions to each crew.

	Crew	Primary	Alternate
Technique 1:	**1**	**LZs**	**Key terrain**
	2	**Key terrain**	**LZs**
	3	**High-speed AAs**	**Enemy location**
	4	**Enemy location**	**High-speed AAs**

	Crew	Video Responsibility
Technique 2:	**1**	**LZs, enemy location, key terrain seen from OP/Route 1**
	2	**Backup for Crew 1**
	3	**LZs, enemy location, key terrain seen from OP/Route 2**
	4	**Backup for Crew 3**

2. **Actions Prior to Take-Off (Preflight):**

- Ensure no entries affecting video recorder status in logbook.
- Place videotape in recorder (have backup tape available).

3. **Actions in Cockpit Prior to Take-Off:**

- Enter all control display unit (CDU) data (verify time and altitude).
- Enter video mission targets (e.g., LZs, enemy locations) into CDU.

- Ensure "VID SEL" switch is in "PLT" or "CPG" as desired. (**Note:** If in "PLT," "NVS" must be selected.)
- Maintenance operational check (MOC) video recorder.
- Turn recorder to “REC.”

4. **Actions at Reconnaissance Objective:**

- Ensure recorder turned to "REC."
- Push "VID REC" button on the "ORT RHG" to start recording. (**Note:** Ensure "recorder" message is displayed in "HAD.") Expect no more than 72 minutes of recording time.
- Select "TGT RPT-ON" in CDU "WPN" page. Verbally state aircraft tail number, crew names, rank, and mission type.
- If aircraft is moving, state airspeed and direction of movement on Internal Communication System (ICS).
- Slave Tactical Air Defense System (TADS) to each successive area of interest previously stored in CDU targets. Use autorange or map association to determine grid; use laser if appropriate.
- Recall each target coordinate on the screen as you slave to it with "TGT RPT-ON."
- Use thumb-force controller to scan immediate area surrounding the stored target (scan in both forward looking infrared (FLIR) and Day TV, if daytime). Try to keep the cross hairs off what you are filming.

TECHNIQUE: Use size, activity, location, unit, time, and enemy (SALUTE) format to orally describe each target on ICS or, as a minimum, use the size, activity, location, and time (SALT) format.

- Observe each target in different FOS. State which FOV is being used on ICS.
- Ensure "APR-39" volume is high enough to be audible on tape.
- Lase and store (if appropriate) all non-planned points of interest or targets that are encountered.
- Recall non-planned target locations on screen with "TGT RPT-ON," and provide SALUTE/SALT report.
- When recon is complete, push "VID REC" button to terminate recording. (**Note:** Ensure "RCDR OFF" message in "HAD" appears.)

BOTTOM LINE: The gun tape is used for both intelligence and evidence at higher levels. Be professional at **all** times while on the tape.

5. Actions Following Mission (Post-Flight and Debrief):

- Place mode switch to "RWND" or "PLAY" and then select "REV" or "FAST" to rewind.
- Once "BOT" is displayed in "HAD," turn recorder to "OFF." (**Note:** Tape cannot be removed if recorder is not turned off.)
- Remove tape and label with mission, crew, aircraft tail number, date, and time of recon. Include a brief written summary of the events on the tape (to include the S2's and crew's analysis) along with the tape, and send to higher. This allows the imagery analysts at division to have first-hand accounts of what they see on the tape.

Chapter 8

PRECISION ROOM CLEARING IN URBAN OPERATIONS

Captain Jose A. Devarona, Thomas P. Odom, and Sergeant First Class Robert Ehrlich of the JRTC CALL Cell and Lieutenant Colonel Mark Meadows, JRTC Operations Group

In recognizing the reality of the contemporary operating environment (COE), emphasis placed on urban operations has only increased at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The center portrays a small urban environment blended with a rural agrarian community set in complex terrain. The urban complex at Shughart-Gordon is the centerpiece for urban operations at the JRTC. Recent shifts in the COE have prompted commanders to look at mounting operations from within the confines of the urban complex. Central to the portrayal of urban operations at the JRTC are the issue of rules of engagement (ROE) and how they influence the scenario in exercising the unit's mission essential task list (METL). Typically such operations focus on precision clearing operations and high intensity urban operations. Conducting precision clearing operations often generates great debate among commanders about the risks precision clearing operations present.[1] Are such operations stacked against the attacker? Are they realistic? Are we really going to conduct precision clearing operations? The answer to all three questions is yes. Mitigating the risks involved in such operations calls for a better understanding of how they fit in the context of urban operations and a mastery of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) involved.

Precision clearing techniques do not replace other techniques currently being used to clear buildings and rooms during high-intensity combat. Specifically, they do not replace the clearing technique in which a fragmentation or concussion grenade is thrown into a room before the U.S. forces enter. Precision room clearing techniques are used when the tactical situation calls for room-by-room clearing of a relatively intact building in which enemy combatants and noncombatants may be intermixed. This technique involves the increased risk of clearing a building methodically, rather than using overwhelming firepower to eliminate or neutralize all its inhabitants. Reference: **FM 3-06.11, *Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain.***

High Intensity Urban Operations

In a surprising and threatening move, the federal forces relied heavily on fuel-air explosives and tactical missiles (SCUD and SCARAB). These systems suppressed the Chechens both physically and psychologically and these assets were used to attack fighters hiding in basements. Such fire strikes were designed for maximum psychological pressure—to demonstrate the hopelessness of further resistance against a foe that could strike with impunity and that was invulnerable to countermeasures. The TOS-1, heavy flame system, (a multiple rocket launcher mounted on a T-72 tank chassis) played a particularly prominent role as a terror weapon.[2]

Equally noteworthy was the battalion's effective use of firepower, which was in keeping with Daniel's slogan, "Knock 'em all down." His principle was to keep up a continuous stream of fire from every available weapon, ranging from rifle to medium artillery. The division and corps artillery had remained south of Aachen when the assault forces moved to their jump-off points east of the city, misleading the enemy as to the Americans' intended axis of advance and permitting the artillery to shoot parallel to the front of the assault troops. This eliminated the danger of "short" rounds falling on friendly troops and allowed the infantry units to call down fire very close to their own positions. By shelling German lines of communication, Daniel isolated objectives. He also used artillery to drive defenders out of the upper floors of specific buildings. Direct fire from tanks, tank destroyers, antitank guns, and machine guns also chased the enemy away from his firing positions. Machine guns commanded the streets along the axis of advance, ready to cut down any evacuating Germans. Daniel's infantry stayed out of the streets whenever possible, preferring to move from building to building by blowing holes in walls. Ideally, by the time the infantry closed in on a given strongpoint, the Germans would have been driven down into the cellars. Grenades and, if necessary, flamethrowers and demolition charges finished the job.[3]

These two historical examples from Grozny 2000 and Aachen 1944 highlight high intensity operations. Conceptually, standard high-intensity room clearing drills mirror a deliberate attack. The task is to seize control of the room and the purpose is to neutralize the enemy in the room. As in a deliberate attack against any objective, the assaulting elements move into position using covered and concealed routes. The fragmentation and or concussion grenades are the preparatory fires used before the assault. Preparatory fires—fragmentation and or concussion grenades—are initiated when Soldiers are as close to the objective as they can get without being injured by the fires. The assault element follows the preparatory fires onto the objective as closely as possible. A rapid, violent assault overwhelms and destroys the enemy force to seize the objective.

Precision Clearing Urban Operations

Besides the safety of American citizens and the defeat of the PDF, BLUE SPOON planners also had to address another aspect of the "end state" desired by the White House: a stable, democratic, and friendly government in Panama, capable of exercising effective leadership as quickly as possible after the old regime had been swept away. To help ensure that outcome, U.S. combat operations had to minimize the damage they inflicted. Planners considered the vast majority of Panamanians themselves to be friendly or neutral toward the United States; every effort had to be made not to put these people or their homes and belongings at risk unnecessarily. Nor could Panama's political, economic, and social infrastructure be destroyed, or even severely damaged, if BLUE SPOON hoped to achieve its strategic objectives.[4]

As for the attacker, one option is to assault the city directly from the march. In medieval and early modern times, however, attacking armies did not typically have sufficient mobility to achieve the surprise necessary to make such a tactic reasonable. Most often, the attacker chose to conduct a siege, an option that allowed him to take his time, make extensive preparations, and culminate his operations with a decisive assault on the city.[5]

One might argue that precision clearing, urban operations is an oxymoron, that precision and urban battles are diametrically opposed. But they are not. If war is political power applied by military means, then precision clearing, urban operations are an effort to make sure the political goals are not destroyed by military means. That is not a new strategy: The siege as an alternative to full assault allowed a more precise threat of force to avoid full fledge attack. If the defenders saw defeat as an inevitable consequence, surrender became the preferred option, that is if they knew the attacking force would not brutalize or even exterminate the city's population. Conventional forces conduct precision clearing operations to defeat an enemy that is mixed with noncombatants and to reduce noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Precision room clearing requires severe accountability of individual and unit actions through strict ROE. It also requires specific TTP for precise use of combat power.

Surgical Urban Operations

In November 1979, a Spetsnaz battalion, clad in Afghan uniforms, deployed to Afghanistan and was incorporated into the presidential security forces, guarding the outer perimeter of Amin's residence. This so-called "Muslim" battalion was made up of Soviet Central Asian soldiers who spoke Pashtu, Dari (a dialect of Farsi), Tadjik or Uzbek. In December, two thirty-man Spetsnaz groups, code-named "Grom" (Thunder) and "Zenit" (Zenith) deployed to Kabul and began reconnaissance of the thirteen objectives that they would have to take out in the coming assault. More members of Zenith deployed later in the month.[6]

In 1702, the Austrians also used surprise and an unexpected approach to capture the northern Italian city of Cremona by infiltrating elite troops into the defense by way of an aqueduct. In 1597, the Spanish captured the city of Amiens in northern France using a ruse. A small group of Spaniards disguised as peasants approached the city gateway, at which point they pretended that their cart had broken a wheel. In tetended that

Precision room clearing is rapidly and methodically seizing control of a room, or multiple rooms, and all of its inhabitants (both hostile and other) by eliminating the threat, dominating the room, and controlling the situation. The sequence for clearing a room is actions at the breach or point of entry, actions upon entry, and fundamentals of room combat.

Actions At The Point Of Entry

A. Movement to the objective

The movement technique used for approaching a target building is dictated by several factors. Among these are the mission, cover and concealment, lighting conditions, type of breach to be used, and terrain.

B. Move close to but do not touch the building exterior

Staying close to the building makes Soldiers harder to see from inside the building. Conversely, the Soldiers should avoid contact with the building, especially banging against the walls with a weapon or other piece of equipment.

C. Do not flag teammates

Train Soldiers to maintain muzzle awareness at all times. A Soldier should never stack with his weapon's muzzle pointing at another Soldier. This is why weapons must be carried at a low or high carry.

D. Use the path of least resistance

The assault team should, whenever possible, line up on the side of the door that provides the path of least resistance upon entering. The swinging door is an obstacle that can best be avoided by lining up on the correct side. If the door opens inward, the team should line up on the hinge side. If the door opens outward, the team should line up on the doorknob side. Lining up on the correct side will result in the fastest and smoothest entry possible. See Figures 1 and 2.



Figure 1
The rule of thumb is that if the door open towards the inside of the room, the #1 man moves away from the door hinges.



Figure 2
If the door swings open toward the outside, the #1 man moves towards the door hinges.

Pass Signals

There are many different ways to pass the signal that everyone is ready. If a stealthy approach to the objective building is possible, the "thumbs back/squeeze up" technique works well.

The #1 man assumes his position on the breach point first. His eyes and weapon are oriented on the breach point. When he feels comfortable with his position, he will signal the #2 man by nodding his head. The #2 man will acknowledge receipt by squeezing the #1 man's shoulder.

After he has received and acknowledged the nod of the #1 man, the #2 man will pass the "thumbs up" signal back to the #3 man. The #3 man will acknowledge by squeezing the #2 man's thumb and will then pass a "thumbs up" back to the man behind him. This will continue until the "thumbs up" signal has been passed back to the last man on the initial entry team. The last man will then squeeze forward, and each subsequent man will send the signal forward so that all in the team are aware that all others are prepared to enter.

Example of a countdown for execution:

5 (The assault starts on 5)

4 (No action)

3 (No action)

2 (Snipers fire) If you have snipers or designated marksman in an over-watch position with the threat elements in their sights.

1 (Breach executed)

Execute Assault

If Soldiers are using tactical lights during their assault, they remove the light covers prior to approaching the building.

If a stealthy approach is impossible, the team modifies the "thumb back/squeeze up" technique to increase speed of entry by reducing time at the entry point. After movement to the objective/building, the #2 man maintains control of the #1 man just long enough to make sure the initial entry team is ready to enter and clear the first room. This action must be rapid but remain controlled or the resulting confusion can be fatal.

Actions Upon Entry

The actions Soldiers will execute upon entering a room are:

A. Clear the point of entry or breach point

The first action to be taken by the Soldier upon entry into a room is to clear the fatal funnel—that area which surrounds the door

threshold. This is the focal point of attention for anyone in the room. By moving quickly, the assault team members reduce the risk of being hit by hostile fire directed at the doorway.



Figure 3

B. Engage immediate threat

The next step is to engage any immediate threat encountered. The following criteria defines an immediate threat:

- Any threat that blocks the movement of the Soldier to his point of domination.
- Any hostile target that is too close to be ignored is an immediate threat. (Although this factor is vague, the decision of what is too close is, in the final analysis, the decision of the individual Soldier. A general guideline of what is too close is whatever is within arm's reach.)

A Soldier must never turn completely around to engage a target. Once he has passed a target, he must move on and not change his mind.

The engagement of a perceived immediate threat cannot slow down the Soldier's movement. Identify the threat by looking at the hands for threatening actions. If the Soldier has to slow down to aim, the target is NOT an immediate threat. Slowing down would also endanger the team as a whole by blocking them in the doorway and violating the principle of speed and the fundamental to dominate the room.

C. Move to point of domination

Corners are the points of domination in any room. The next action the assault team takes is to clear those corners and occupy them as points of domination. The #1 man and the number #2 man are initially responsible for the corners. If the #1 man and the #2 man are unable to clear the corners, the #3 man and the #4 man must assume this critical responsibility. Each Soldier has a primary and secondary sector of fire (see figures above).

Note: If one of the Soldiers has a weapon malfunction, that Soldier should sound off with weapon down, take a knee and work through his malfunction. The other Soldiers will scan his sector of fire. This works because all sectors of fire are interlocking therefore providing redundant firepower. To avoid fratricide, the Soldier should not stand up until one of his fellow Soldiers moves to him and taps him on the shoulder.

D. Clear sector of fire

Every man has a primary and secondary sector of fire en route to his point of domination. Upon reaching the point of domination, each Soldier scans his sectors of fire from the point of domination. Each Soldier will have a primary and secondary sector.

E. Collapse sectors of fire

Once each man on the team has reached their points of domination they ensure they have interlocking sectors of fire.



Figure 4


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #1 Man
The #1 man goes to the point of least resistance and clears his primary sector of fire.

Figure 5



Figure 6


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #1 Man
Primary
Secondary
The #1 man reaches his point of domination. From his point of domination he scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 7



Figure 8


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #2 Man
The #2 man moves in the opposite direction from the #1 man and clears his primary sector of fire.

Figure 9



Figure 10


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #2 Man
Primary
Secondary
Once he reaches his point of domination he scans his primary and secondary sectors.

Figure 11


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #2 Man
Primary
Primary
Secondary
Secondary
Both men have a primary and secondary sector of fire. Note that they have interlocking sectors of fire.

Figure 12



Figure 13


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #3 Man
The #3 man moves in the opposite direction from the #2 man and clears his primary sector of fire.

Figure 14


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #3 Man
Secondary
Primary
Once he reaches his point of domination he scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 15



Figure 16



Figure 17


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #4 Man
The #4 man moves in the opposite direction from the #3 man and clears his primary sector of fire.

Figure 18



Figure 19


Strong Wall Technique, Center Door #4 Man
Primary
Secondary
Once he reaches his point of domination he scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 20


Strong Wall Technique, Interlocking Sectors of Fire
Each man is at his point of domination with primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 21



Figure 22



Figure 23



Figure 24



Figure 25


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #1 Man
The #1 man continues clearing his sector of fire en route to his point of domination.

Figure 26


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #1 Man
Secondary
Primary
Once the #1 man reaches his point of domination he scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 27



Figure 28



Figure 29



Figure 30


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #2 Man
Then he clears his primary sector of fire. His point of domination is about half way down the wall. The exact point of domination depends on the size of the room.

Figure 31



Figure 32


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #2 Man
Secondary
Primary
The #2 man reaches his point of domination and scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 33


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #2 Man
The #1 collapses his sector of fire and scans his primary and secondary sector of fire. The #2 man scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire. Note the interlocking sectors of fire.

Figure 34



Figure 35


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #3 Man
The #3 man moves in the opposite direction from the #2 man. He clears his primary sector of fire.

Figure 36



Figure 37


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #3 Man
Primary
Secondary
Once he reaches his point of domination he scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 38



Figure 39



Figure 40


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #4 Man
The #4 man moves in the opposite direction from the #3 man and clears his primary sector of fire.

Figure 41



Figure 42


Strong Wall Technique, Corner Door #4 Man
Secondary
Primary
The #4 man reaches his point of domination and scans his primary and secondary sectors of fire.

Figure 43



Figure 44

Although this technique is an effective procedure for clearing a room, leaders may be required to modify the action to meet their current situation. Some example reasons and methods of modifying the technique are shown below as dictated in FM 3-06.11.

REASON	METHOD
Objective rooms are consistently small.	**Clear with two or three men.**
Shortage of personnel.	**Clear in teams of two or three.**
Enemy poses no immediate threat.	**One or two men search each room to ensure no enemy or noncombatants are present.**
No immediate threat and speed is of the essence.	**One man visually searches each room.**

Table 3-1. Reasons and methods for modifying entry technique, FM 3-06.11

F. Three- and two-man teams

When full four-man teams are not available for room clearing three- and two-man teams can be used. Figures 45 and 46 show the points of domination and sectors of fire for a three-man clearing team. Figures 47 and 48 show the same thing for a two-man team. Leaders should use the entry technique blueprint when modifying their techniques.


Strong Wall Technique, Three Man Center Door
Each man still moves to his point of domination clearing his primary sector first then his secondary. Once they reach their point of domination, they scan their primary and secondary sectors ensuring they have interlocking sectors of fire.

Figure 45
Points of domination and sectors of fire (three-man team, center door)


Strong Wall Technique, Three Man Corner Door
Each man still moves to his point of domination clearing his primary sector first then his secondary. Once they reach their point of domination, they scan their primary and secondary sectors ensuring they have interlocking sectors of fire.

Figure 46
Points of domination and sectors of fire (three-man team, corner door)


Strong Wall Technique, Two Man Center Door
Each man still moves to his point of domination clearing his primary sector first then his secondary. Once they reach their point of domination, they scan their primary and secondary sectors ensuring they have interlocking sectors of fire.

Figure 47
Points of domination and sectors of fire (two-man team, center door)


Strong Wall Technique, Two Man Corner Door
Each man still moves to his point of domination clearing his primary sector first then his secondary. Once they reach their point of domination, they scan their primary and secondary sectors ensuring they have interlocking sectors of fire.

Figure 48
Points of domination and sectors of fire (two-man team, center door)

Note: Each man still clears and scans the same sectors of fire as he would if it was a four man team clearing the room. This allows each man to always execute the same action. Remember, keep it simple!

G. Control the situation

The actions of the assault team control the situation. By dominating the room and eliminating any threat, the assault team seizes control of the room and the initiative from the enemy. Inaction or slow execution gives the initiative back to any hostile element in the room. Live noncombatants or friendly personnel not engaged must also be controlled. The control measures used can be both verbal and physical.

The team leader or a designated team member must immediately begin speaking to any people in the room in a loud, commanding voice. He must take charge. Verbal control may be difficult because of the loss of hearing resulting from explosives and firearms use. Verbiage should be short and to the point, and it should be loud enough to be heard by those whose hearing may have been damaged by the sound of gunfire and explosives.

Physical control must be firm, but not overly harsh. Pain elicits response. Needlessly inflicting pain on friendly personnel may cause them to react in an unexpected manner, such as fighting back. This means possibly losing control rather than gaining it.

H. Search the dead

Searching the dead has only one function: to ensure they no longer pose a threat. With security, move all weapons away from the dead and conduct an "eye thump" on each body to ensure they are truly dead.

I. Search the room

There are two techniques: cursory or detailed.

1. Cursory room search. Avoid opening drawers and moving items and unnecessary disruption of the room when you search. It should be quick, systematic, and according to unit standing operating procedures (SOP).

2. Detailed room search. These may be done based on the mission and time available on the objective.

J. Search the living

Searching the living should be cursory. It can be a standing modified search, kneeling search, or a prone handcuffing search. The situation will dictate the method of searching the living.

K. Ammunition, casualty, and equipment (ACE)/size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment (SALUTE) reports

SALUTE reports should be according to unit SOP. Leaders must have friendly unit situational awareness. The ACE/SALUTE reports should consist of the status of the assigned sector (secured or unsecured), the status of the assaulters in the sector (wounded, dead), the number and status of friendly noncombatants encountered, the number and status of personnel of unknown disposition, and the number and status of combatants encountered. Sending in the count allows commanders to reinforce subordinate leaders and to determine when the overall objective is completely secured. It also allows the commander to set priorities for evacuation.

Note: Consider doing this through hand and arm signals. If Soldiers start communicating their status, it is very possible that the enemy in the room next door will gain information on your status.

L. Evacuate on command

The last action is to evacuate the objective area on command. The overall commander of the objective will make the determination as to when the assault teams are ready to evacuate from the objective. If personnel or equipment recovery was the purpose of the clearing operation, the personnel or equipment should be immediately evacuated from the target area and extracted with the assault team.

Priorities for evacuation may be set in the operation order (OPORD) or based on the current situation.

If friendly personnel/adjacent units are outside the objective area, they must be notified prior to the assault team's exiting the objective area to avoid fratricide.

Once the assault teams leave the objective area, they should return to normal patrolling procedures in case of a counterattack by an enemy reaction force or any surviving enemy in the target area.

Conclusion

Room clearing has always been fundamental to urban operations, be they high intensity assaults as encountered in Grozny 2000 or Aachen 1944, precision clearing operations as in Panama, the success of a medieval siege, or the surgical operations conducted by the Soviets in Kabul or the Austrians infiltrating an Italian city in 1702. Still it can be argued that the basic techniques in room clearing have become more central to basic Soldier skills than they were in recent decades. The expansion of urban areas, the imbalance between opposing military forces, or the strategic importance of an urban center means that one or both sides may choose to fight inside a city. COE recognizes this trend. Both attacker and defender will use room-clearing techniques in such a struggle. It should be apparent that casual familiarity with precision room clearing techniques is a formula for disaster. Untrained or unrehearsed Soldiers trying to breach a defended building are as likely to kill each other as they are the enemy. Meanwhile, a skilled defender will devastate the amateur urban attacker.

1 Thomas P. Odom. "METL, MREs and MOUT: Shughart-Gordon is Training Not War!" *News from the Front*, July-August 20002. Center for Army Lessons Learned.

2 Timothy L. Thomas. "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned". Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previously published in *Military Review*, July-August 2000.

3 Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. "Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, The 2d Battalion, 26th Infantry at Aachen, October 1944." Published in *Combined Arms in Battle since 1939*, Dr. Roger Spiller, editor. Combat Studies Institute. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

4 Lawrence A. Yates. Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama City, December 1989.

5 Lou DiMarco. "Attacking the Heart and Guts: Urban Operations through the Ages."

6 Lester Grau. "The Take-Down of Kabul: An Effective Coup de Main."

7 DiMarco.

Chapter 9

INTEGRATING IO WITH CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS: Using Non-Lethal Effects In SOSO

Thomas P. Odom, JRTC CALL Cell Military Analyst

Cordon and search operations capture in many ways the many factors inherent in dealing with the complexity of the contemporary operational environment (COE) (see Chapter 1). Cordon and search operations are also a standard task in stability operations and support operations (SOSO). When one thinks of SOSO, cordon and search operations come to mind. But are cordon and search operations the decisive fight in SOSO or more a task used to achieve the operational and strategic goals set forth by the campaign plan? This article will examine the latter description with a focus on a hierarchy that places information operations (IO) above the priorities inherent in a cordon and search mission.

Using this approach to cordon and search operations forces the tactical commander to consider IO in all phases of such a mission, beginning with mission analysis and continuing all the way through execution and reorganization. From the point that a commander receives a cordon and search operation from his superior, that commander should examine how such an operation fits into his superior's IO plan. In an ideal world, the superior should make his intent clear; in a less than ideal world, the commander getting the mission may have to seek clarification.

Taking the next higher's intent into consideration, a battalion commander given the mission to conduct a cordon and search mission in a village or sector of a city would first determine the goal of the search. If it is arms, what has the overall IO message been with regard to arms? Have the locals been directed to surrender all arms? Have they been offered rewards if they chose to do so? What are the consequences if they are found to be stockpiling arms or worse, supplying arms to local insurgents? The answers to these types of questions should drive parts of the mission analysis for a cordon and search looking for weapons. Similar questions on possible insurgents, local sympathizers, and related IO messages would drive mission analysis on a cordon and search looking for suspected insurgents.

As standard portions of a cordon and search operation are planned, similar IO considerations such as non-lethal effects should factor into that planning. Take, for instance, the inner and outer cordons. In an area with an ongoing IO attempting to calm an area and make the inhabitants more willing to cooperate, the commander must relate the current success of that IO with what he plans to do in establishing his inner and outer cordons. An openly hostile area is a clear challenge to both IO goals and the success of a cordon and search. In such cases, IO planning must be integrated and synchronized with the cordon and search. One way would be to embed tactical psychological teams (TPT) with the inner and outer cordons to explain the intent of the operation and perhaps lessen the level of hostility.

Another consideration is the IO aspects of special teams; indigenous forces; and local political, legal, or religious leaders. There are special IO related teams suggested as parts of each of the major components of a cordon and

search. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) may suggest those teams are useful or indicate they are not. But part of the METT-TC evaluation of their usefulness and potential missions should include IO aspects. Local civil defense, army, or other forces may play a role in a cordon and search. Since these forces will undoubtedly speak to the locals in the process of screening prisoners or other tasks, the cordon and search commander should consider what IO themes they might address. Similar thinking applies to using local leaders; if an IO has succeeded in establishing a relationship with a local mayor, police chief, or cleric, a commander planning a cordon and search in their area should use those contacts as part of his IO planning.

As noted above, there are several situations where IO should be embedded in the planning for a cordon and search. The "IO Battle Drill for Cordon and Search Operations" in Appendix F is taken from the ***Effects Based Operations Handbook***. The central point of the battle drill is that IO is often the decisive operation in SOSO. A cordon and search operation should support the overall effects sought in mounting that IO, and that means that IO planning in a cordon and search cannot be an afterthought. The maneuver commander given such a mission cannot simply wish it away by saying, “the civil affairs (CA) guys will come in behind us to fix things when we are done.”

Chapter 10

Medical Integration in Information Operations

Captain Adrian Gamez, Senior Medical O©, JRTC Operations Group

Medical operators must be integrated in the information operations (IO) campaign and assist the IO planners in developing a medical plan designed to maintain the operational and tactical intent of the commander. Although medical is often an afterthought in stability operations and support operations (SOSO), what follows is a technique commanders can use to modify behavior and win the hearts and minds of the people.

Medical Operations and Non-Lethal Effects

Health service support in SOSO can be defined as those actions encompassing all military health-related activities or programs established to further U.S. national goals, objectives, and missions. Health service support assists the development and refinement of host-nation (HN) medical infrastructure, provides and maintains the basic necessities of life for the general population through HN civilian medical programs, and provides assistance in establishing, repairing, or improving basic health and sanitation services (sewers, water, energy, academics, transportation - medical and security [SWEAT-MS]).

In SOSO, the medical planner must be aware of other support agencies. U.S. governmental agencies, allies, coalition partners, host nation (HN), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), and religious groups may also operate in the area of operation. The planner must be able to coordinate with these organizations when necessary.

The medical planner will have humanitarian affairs (HA) money provided to the brigade surgeon's cell. This money must be tracked vigorously to ensure that fraud, waste, and/or abuse do not occur. The table of organization (TOE) dollars cannot be spent on humanitarian assistance (HA) operations. It is illegal and a violation of Title X. A list of medical supplies is provided to task forces (TFs) to requisition specifically for HA medical operations. Do not deviate from the medical list provided. These supplies will include sick-call type medications and some trauma supplies; however, the medical supplies are limited to prevent a long-term medical dependence on U.S. forces. Often this is a hard pill to swallow for our medical providers.

TTP FOR MEDICAL IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

As an active member of the IO staff, the medical planner advises the senior IO planner on how to best use medical assets in support of SOSO. Medical planners produce operations orders based on S3 guidance, S2 intelligence reports, and civil affairs and psychological operations input. In order to achieve the commander’s IO initiatives (political, economic, psychological, and military), medical planners should request input for placement of medical assets from other supporting agencies. Medical planners should give clear guidance including specific tasks, purpose, and end state. Additionally, any command messages that have to be distributed to the local population must be included in the operations order. Upon completion of a

medical mission, an after-action review (AAR) must be submitted back to the chief of the information/operations cell. The S2 will interpret the information provided; the civil affairs cell will determine the additional needs of the local populace; the psychological operations cell will determine if behavior is being modified; and the medical unit will stay apprised of the activities of other medical units in the area of operations (AO). The majority of the medical missions are medical civil actions programs (MEDCAPs).

Note: Medical planners, not tactical planners, plan medical missions. Example: A tactical operator planned a MEDCAP for a subordinate medical element to assess a town. Because the term "assess" was used, the tasked medical unit sent a preventive medicine team to assess the town. However, the civil affairs team wanted a treatment team to assist the local population; the confusion caused friction between the local national population and U.S. forces.

MEDCAPS in Cordon and Search Operations

MEDCAPs can be used as a part of decisive operations in support of IO operations. For example: As a task force (TF) plans a cordon and search of a town in order to look for suspected personnel, the IO cell must plan crisis management and talking points to explain to the local national population the reason for the cordon and search operation. Should the tactical commander elect to use a MEDCAP in support of the decisive operation, he/she must articulate to the medical planner: how long the MEDCAP is scheduled to last, the talking points, who the local key leaders are, and who will escort and provide security.

The MEDCAP personnel must rehearse action on the objective (the MEDCAP operation itself) and understand all command messages. If a MEDCAP operation is embedded in the decisive operation, it must be synchronized in a key event synchronization matrix to determine when medical personnel will be called forward. Tactical commanders and medical planners do not let the MEDCAP operation begin without security. Although the local population may understand the need for the cordon and search, those innocently caught up in the operation may be upset or possibly hostile. This hostility could prove lethal. The MEDCAP is a sign of good faith, not an apology for the operation that occurred.

MEDCAPS and Civil Affairs

We conduct health civil actions programs (HC)/humanitarian assistance (HA) missions to improve our relationships with other nations by winning their hearts and minds. The Department of Defense (DoD) conducts these missions to improve "the security interests of both the US and the country in which activities are to be carried out," and to "improve the specific operation readiness of the members of the Armed Forces who participate in the activities."

There are several types of health civil actions programs:

- Medical civil action programs (MEDCAPs) are short duration, primary medical care missions that provide treatment for acute

minor illnesses (equivalent to Army sick call) for local nationals (LN).

- Dental civil action programs (DENCAPs) are missions that provide emergency and preventive dental care and preventive oral hygiene instruction to under-served local nationals. Dental procedures, such as extractions and sedative fillings, may be done if it is determined that the patients' overall health and well-being would be improved, even though follow-up care is not available. Dental procedures that require follow-up treatment or extensive oral surgery will not be done.

- Veterinary civil action programs (VETCAPs) are missions that provide primary veterinary medical care to local nationals and increase the availability of primary veterinary care to areas already covered by a local national veterinarian by providing critical, unavailable equipment, supplies, and training.

- Optical civil action programs (OPTCAPs) are a humanitarian assistance mission to provide eye care to local nationals in need. OPTCAP missions will continue until local national or non-governmental organizations in a certain location can provide eye care.

Preventive medicine can be a part of health civil action programs. In CA units, assigned preventive medicine personnel assess the public health capabilities of a country but are not responsible for directly providing preventive medicine personnel. As such, preventive medicine personnel are assigned to CA companies, detachments, brigades, and commands. The number and type of preventive medicine personnel assigned is dependent upon the unit. Since the staff's role is advisory, it has no organic equipment and must coordinate for support from preventive medicine detachments and the area of operations (AO) supporting medical laboratory.

CONCLUSIONS

Medical operations are a true force multiplier in SOSO. Given the paramount importance of information operations in SOSO, anything that a commander can use to bolster his IO plan should be employed as an integrated and synchronized element to achieve combined arms effects, both lethal and non-lethal. Medical operations used in that manner support the overall IO campaign and whatever localized operation is taking place. A MEDCAP built into a cordon and search operation offers a dramatic offset to the negative aspects of such operations. A civil affairs team looking to extend U.S. influence will find MEDCAPs invaluable. But regardless of mission, the key to success in medical operations is the same for all operations: plan and coordinate to integrate and synchronize.

Here is an example of an appendix to a "Non Lethal Annex" that supports non-lethal targeting.

References:

a. TF Medical Civil Assistance Program SOP, dtd.

b. TF OPORD ##-##, OPERATION XXXX

c. TF OPORD ##-##, OPERATION XXXX

d. TF OPORD ##-##, OPERATION XXXX

e. Reporting Format for Information Operations (IO) Assessment of Engagements, dtd .

1. Situation. See base order.

2. Mission. No change.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of the Operation. MEDCAPS provide the people of _____ with needed care while supporting TF IO objectives and collection efforts. Per command guidance, TF uses MEDCAPs and other medically oriented programs (e.g. local nation healthcare improvement) to modify behavior and facilitate a multi-ethnic society in _____. Units should plan their MEDCAPs in locations that facilitate multi-ethnic access. Battalion commanders may now cancel MEDCAPs as a punitive measure when local behavior is not sufficiently modified or if the local leadership is not responsive to TF direction. Finally, as we look to the future and eventual _____ withdrawal from _____, we will soon enter a transitional phase for MEDCAPs when we will be assisting the local health care system "stand on its on two feet" and then end MEDCAPs altogether.

However, for the time being, what specifically is offered at a MEDCAP is at the discretion of the unit commander and could range from health examinations/hygiene classes, to assessments of local health capabilities, to distributing winter clothes or school supplies. Maneuver battalions continue to incorporate MEDCAP planning in conjunction with their targeting process to advance information operations (IO) themes and to facilitate collection. DS medical assets also provide specialty civil assistance programs (DEN, OPT, VET) to the above MEDCAP operations.

b. (U) Tasks to subordinate units

(1) TF XXX.

(a) Conduct a MEDCAP and OPTCAP in (grid location) on DTG. Coordinate with higher medical facility for optometrist. Direct coordination with in-sector commander is required. Disseminate IO messages; see coordinating instructions.

(b) Conduct a MEDCAP or other medical engagement at the (local national) hospital, grid location on DTG. Direct coordination with in sector

commander is required. Disseminate IO messages; see coordinating instructions.

(2) TF XXX

(a) Conduct a MEDCAP and DENCAP in town of _____, grid location on DTG. Unit will find ethnically neutral location easily accessible between two towns in order to facilitate an inter-ethnic MEDCAP/DENCAP. Coordinate with PSYOP in order to (IOT) assist with recon for MEDCAP and provide broadcasting of MEDCAP IOT ensure widest dissemination of MEDCAP. Direct coordination with higher medical unit for dental officer is required. Direct coordination with in-sector commander is required. Disseminate IO messages; see coordinating instructions.

c. Coordinating instructions.

(1) Executing units forward a MEDCAP AAR to TFF MED PLANS NLT 72 hours after execution.

(2) IO messages:

1)
2)
3)

4. Service and Support. No change.

5. Command and Signal. No change.

Example of MEDCAP AAR

DATE:
TOWN:
MUNICIPALITY:
UNIT:

1. ENGAGEMENT INFORMATION

a. TFF IO objective (OBJ):

b. Unit IO OBJ:

c. Target:

d. Purpose/desired effect:

e. Asset:

f. Method and message:

g. Assessment:

h. MOE(s) for further assessment:

I. IR(s) derived from MOE(s):

2. GENERAL INFORMATION

a. 6 Digit grid coordinate:

b. Size of population:

1) Adults

2) Children

3) Infants

c. Ethnicity of population:

1): ___%

2): ___%

3) Other: ___% (describe other)

d. Housing and accessibility of hygiene and sanitation measures:

1) Number of houses and typical type of construction to include heating:

2) Latrines:

3) Water pumps:

4) Water source and how used (bathing, laundry, and cooking):

e. Availability of water (source, quality, quantity, and contaminants, or other test results):

f. Epidemiology (TOP 3):

Complaint or Illness	# of patients afflicted/total # of patients

g. Status of sanitation impacting on the overall health:

h. Insects, plants, and animals of medical importance:

I. Religious, social, and/or political factors of medical importance:

j. Communications means and accessibility:

k. Quality of road network (describe in detail from main supply route [MSR] to town and roads in town, include the largest vehicle you think could safely use the road):

l. Grid to nearest area large enough to use as LZ:

1) UH-60

2) CH-47

m. Three leading causes of death in:

1) Adults

2) Children

3) Infants

n. Numbers and type of animals (include both pets and work animals):

o. Number of animals that died in the last three months and causes of death:

p. Political and socioeconomic situation (include unemployment rate, living conditions; infant mortality rate; refugee or displaced persons situation):

q. Non governmental organizations operating in the area of operations (AO):

3. HEALTH SERVICES

a. Organization and administration (to include public and private):

b. Accessibility to care (to include physical, social, and financial barriers):

c. Comments on overall quality of civilian health care:

d. Significant medical individuals:

	Name	Specialty	# of days per week in town
Doctors			
Nurses			
Health tech			
Midwives			

e. Medical training and education programs:

Course/School	Location	Type of Training

f. Nearest medical clinic (name, distance from town, ethnicity it will treat:)

g. Medical infrastructure (including locations and capabilities of medical facilities [size, patient capacity, and types of specialties]; location of medical waste incinerators):

h. Analysis of medical evacuation services (including analysis of local medical evacuation services and capabilities; coordination and synchronization of local evacuation services/resources to redirect civilian patients):

I. Analysis of medical services provided by NGOs:

4. MEDICAL MATERIAL

a. Bio-medical equipment:

Type of Equipment	Maintenance Status	Source of Repair

b. Analysis of local medical supply sources (including quantity, quality, and availability of local medical supplies and equipment; availability of blood and blood products, availability of supplies for use for local populace, refugees, and displaced persons [to include donated supplies or those of an NGO such as the UN]; and availability and quality of medicinal gases):

5. MEDCAP SPECIFICS

a. Personnel that participated in the mission:

Name	Rank	Unit

b. Start DTG and end DTG of recon for mission:

Chapter 11

Air-Ground Integration: Recent Trends Integrating Army Aviation into the Cordon and Search

Captain Phil Graham, Captain Joel Magsig, Captain Chad Ward, JRTC Aviation Division Cavalry and Attack Team

Army aviation provides a critical element, one integral to the success of combined arms operations. Attack and cavalry helicopters, the AH-64 Apache and the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, are vital to any ground maneuver commander involved in cordon and search operations. Their capabilities, when fully integrated within the planning process, enhance the ground commander's ability to succeed.

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) strives to incorporate an aviation component into each rotational exercise. Throughout the past year, active and reserve components along with National Guard units have capitalized on these training opportunities. Additionally, JRTC routinely employs its own aviation assets, the aviation division observer/controllers (O/Cs) and OH-58C Kiowa helicopters from the JRTC O© flight detachment, to replicate cavalry and attack assets during rotations without friendly forces (BLUFOR) aviation assets.

JRTC recently used these aviation assets in situational training exercises (STX) on cordon and search operations prior to standard force-on-force rotational operations. The STX lanes prepare and train each company-level ground maneuver commander for particular scenarios common to their future theater of operations. The cordon and search lane provides an excellent opportunity to practice air-ground integration (AGI), especially the detailed coordination required to succeed. An aviation liaison officer (LNO) in the planning phase enhances integration of aviation assets into the ground tactical plan.

Members of the JRTC aviation division cavalry/attack team served as both O/Cs and mission executors, and the trends encountered during the cordon and search lane were consistent with both active and reserve component forces. The following observations highlight several of the trends observed during these recent STX lanes. The comments focus specifically on air-ground integration to assist ground maneuver commanders in preparation for cordon and search operations or any mission in which air-ground integration is critical.

MANEUVER ELEMENT

The first step in any air-ground integration is to recognize that cavalry and attack helicopter elements primarily serve as an additional maneuver element rather than just a fires platforms. This recognition dictates additional, integrated planning requirements, as well as the establishment of a command and control (C2) structure capable of handling both air and ground assets. Army aviation does not perform close air support (CAS). CAS typically relies on initial points (IPs) away from the maneuver area and keeps air assets out of the mission until the ground maneuver commander requires immediate assistance.

Instead of CAS, Army aviation integrates into each mission at the lowest level possible to enhance overall success. Close combat attacks (CCAs) require detailed integration for success. Apaches and Kiowa Warriors execute a wide range of missions (security, attack, reconnaissance [recon]) and tactical tasks (destroy, neutralize, delay, disrupt, block) much like any ground element in support of a commander's mission. These aircraft provide reconnaissance and observation enhancing the overall situational awareness, as well as providing direct fire when required. Additionally, aviation is adaptable and capable of changing "on the fly" as the mission responds to enemy actions.

As applied to the cordon and search mission in the STX lanes, cavalry and attack helicopters provide the ground commander essential capabilities for the conduct of this operation. The aircraft normally conduct route reconnaissance in support of ground movement to the objective with an initial observation and assessment of the situation within each objective. The best results occurred when ground commanders focus initial observations according to specific intelligence requirements. These observations might be the situation around the target building, the location of a specific vehicle, or detection of anything attempting to exit the objective prior to the establishment the outer cordon. Cavalry and attack helicopters utilize sensors/video capabilities to gather requested information without alerting or heightening tensions of the people within the village. Once the cordon is set, the initial plans call for aviation to provide area security outside the inner cordon and mostly beyond the outer cordon. This task keeps the aviation element focused "out," away from the objective searching for elements attempting to influence the ground commander's mission (focus out). The typical scenario uses an opposing forces (OPFOR) technical vehicle and mortar team forcing a CCA opportunity during execution. Finally, aviation assets accomplish an egress route recon once the ground element completes its mission within the objective or the helicopter's fuel situation dictates an early departure.

PLAN FOR SUCCESS

The maneuver mind set dictates additional planning requirements for both air and ground. For any operation to be successful, all players must execute from the same page. This remains true for air-ground integration especially during cordon and search operations. To enhance the ground commander's success, aviators must completely understand the ground maneuver plan. Air assets require the same mission planning products as any ground platoon: maneuver graphics, objective sketches, imagery, target-list worksheet, no fire areas (NFAs)/restricted fire areas (RFAs), and the communication plan (C2). Additionally, friendly marking techniques, clearance of fires, aviation rules of engagement (ROE), and downed aviator/aircraft issues create additional situations that must be covered during planning and rehearsals, preferably with the aviators present. Many of these issues can be addressed without a designated mission and can be drilled at company level.

The STX lanes revealed an over-reliance on the aviation liaison officer (LNO) to develop the air portion of the ground commander's plan. While any commander certainly relies on LNO support, many units lack a general understanding of the capabilities and typical tasks of Army aviation. To

assist units as they prepare for future operations, the cavalry/attack team developed an "AGI Smart Card" (see Appendix A) for ground units. It provides the ground commander an immediate reference to address general AGI questions without the presence of an aviation LNO.

The C2 plan varied among the companies on the cordon and search lane. Most company C2 plans placed air assets on the company command net (FM frequency hop) while some chose to inject an intermediary control element placing air on an alternate net such as the fires net. While the latter can succeed and may be required based on the competing tasks facing the ground commander, only the companies that rehearsed and practiced this plan truly made it work. Using the command net provides the greatest amount of situational awareness (SA) to all assets. Army aviation enhanced that SA immediately through situation reports of important activity. This proved crucial as numerous civilian vehicles approached the objectives along various avenues of approach. Alternate nets require additional time transmitting such key information to the critical players. Moreover, alternate nets create additional problems and issues given only the ground "commander" has the authority to clear fires, not the third party controlling the air assets.

The communication plan serves as a vital item within the planning process; the communications plan either enhanced or drastically hindered the overall mission. Items such as crypto net variables and time-of-day as well as competing terminology such as "unsecure" and "plain text" affected actual execution. Those spending adequate time during planning to establish primary and contingency frequencies and ensure all personnel were trained on radio operations saw the benefits in the actual lane execution. Often, aviators provided the ground personnel a single-channel unsecure (plain text) frequency as an initial communications "link-up" net and a worse case contingency for communication.

CORDON AND SEARCH EXECUTION

The initial aircraft check-in with ground elements sets the tone for success on any mission. Aviators must transmit the minimal essential information to the ground executors: call signs, total number of aircraft, current location and estimated time of arrival (ETA), ordnance available, and available time on-station (how long will fuel permit air to stay in the area - possibly the most crucial piece of information). Ground forces should immediately return a current situation report (SITREP) along with any critical updates or changes to the initial plan. These requirements may increase based on the level of air-ground integration during the planning process (operation may be hasty). Army aviation doctrine prescribes the use of the standard 9-line close air support (CAS) check-in brief as a minimal reference for ground to transmit the pertinent data to any air platform.

The STX lanes reinforce this process as units ready to receive air assets proved ready to adapt to the cordon and search environment. The air tasks prior to the establishment of the outer cordon never changed, though some refined the observation tasks seeking more specific information. Within the objective, several ground units altered the air tasks based on enemy actions inside the towns. Making use of the air's observation capabilities, some ground maneuver commanders accepted risk beyond the outer cordon

refocusing air in search of snipers or other observation tasks inside the town (focus in). Once each situation reached resolution, the ground commanders returned air assets to the initial area security mission (focus out). This quick shift between "focus out" versus "focus in" only worked for those companies who tracked aviation much like one of their own maneuver platoons. Those companies capable of developing and refining both the ground and air tasks during the cordon and search proved most successful on the STX lanes.

Lastly, nearly every ground maneuver element found it relatively easy to communicate with air assets. Those who prepared the most during the planning process used products such as town sketches to vector air throughout the operation. Their terminology appeared the same as with any maneuver platoon element.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the basic element for any mission success is the ability to place all elements affecting the company-level mission on a common operating picture. This includes Army aviation assets, a crucial combat multiplier to any commander. Mission planning serves as the starting point to achieve this end. However, Army aviation, especially attack and cavalry platforms such as the Apaches and Kiowa Warriors, are ready to adjust and adapt to the battlefield environment just like any maneuver element. The JRTC STX lanes provide a unique opportunity for many ground maneuver commanders to execute the cordon and search mission with all the crucial assets typically found in a combat theater. The opportunity challenges both air and ground to their fullest. The training value proves immense; the lessons learned are great.

Appendix A

AGI Smart Card

Air-Ground Integration Smart Card

General Comments

- Aviation assets have limited station time; use your aviation efficiently.
- Task organize aviation assets as a maneuver element.
- Maintain communication with aviation units as other maneuver elements.
- Give specific tasks/purposes.
- Weapons systems can cause collateral damage.
- Weapon systems cannot differentiate between friendly and hostile personnel.
- Plan should not be dependent upon aviation.
- Plan for aviation on all missions.

Aviation Missions

- Security (area, screen, air assault)
- Attack (hasty, deliberate, shaping, decisive, close combat attacks ([CCA])
- Reconnaissance (zone, area, route)
- Defend

Aviation Tactical Tasks

- Destroy
- Block
- Neutralize
- Defeat
- Delay

Employment

- Direct fire
- Observation
- Reconnaissance (area, route, zone)
- Security

Operational Graphics

- Attack by fire (ABF)
- Support by fire (SBF)
- Battle position (BP)
- Observation post (OP)

Communications

- Use command (CMD) net: maintain communication with air mission commander (AMC) on the CMD net.
- Ensure you have primary, alternate (single channel frequency), and contingency communications.
- Other aircraft may monitor alternate frequencies (fires, platoons, operations and intelligence).
- Use plain/simple language.
- Rehearse with crews, if possible.

Check-In Brief

Aircraft check-in:

- Unit/call sign
- Number and type of aircraft
- Ordnance onboard/laser code
- Current location/ETA
- Time on station
- Task/purpose
- ABF/BP

Supported Units Attack Brief:

- Unit identification
- Target description*
- Target location*
- Type of mark/laser code*
- Location of friendly forces and unit markings
- Proposed ABF/BP (include direction of fire)
- Fire support (include control of fires, clearance of fires)
- Threat situational report (SITREP) (not limited to ADA systems)
- Support unit attack helicopter control measures/anti-fratricide measures

Clearance of Fires

- Establish communications with aircraft
- Ensure task/purpose is known
- Know subordinate unit locations
- Pass information as per check-in brief
- Ensure ROE criteria is met

*** See reverse side for further detail.*

Marking Techniques

Day

- VS17 panel
- Smoke
- Star cluster
- Signal mirror
- Reverse polarity paper/panel
- Laser designator
- Combat identification panel
- Tracers

Night

- Infrared (IR) strobe (if aircrew has goggles)
- Spot light
- Chem stick on a string
- IR spot light
- IR laser pointer
- Laser designator
- Combat identification panel
- Tracer fire

** You must know your unit's location*

Aircraft Capabilities

AH-64 A/D: optics: FLIR, Day TV (x128 magnification), video recorder; weapons: 30 mm (4 m burst radius), range, up to 4 km; 2.75 in rockets (50 m burst radius), range, 500 m to 7.5 km; Hellfire, range 500 m-8 km; normal flight profile: 30 min, 300 rounds, Hellfire missiles, 4 to 8; 2.75 in rockets, 20-38; flight time: 2.5 to 3.5 hours.

OH58D: optics: FLIR, Day TV, video recorder; .weapons: 50 cal, range, up to 2 km; 2.75 in rockets; 1-2 Hellfire can be substituted for rockets or .50 cal. Normal flight profile: .50 cal, 400 rounds; 2.75 in rockets, 7 rockets; flight time, *2.5 hours.*

Air-Ground Integration (AGI)
Target Handover Event Matrix


Aviation makes initial contact with ground maneuver element (GME) on company command net; provides aviation SITREP; receives GME SITREP
Can aircraft positively ID friendly location?
Does tactical situation impose low fratricide risk?
Continue search, commo, and signaling techniques
Aviation conducts mission in accordance with (IAW) ground scheme of maneuver
Receives target handover from GME
Aircraft maneuvers to target
Type 1 = GME has enemy and attack aircraft in sight
Type 2 = GME has only the aircraft or the target in sight
Type 3 = visual acquisition of neither aircraft nor target is required due to low risk of fratricide
GME appropriately marks target (Type 1)
Can aircraft positively ID the target mark?
Aircraft
Moves to another vantage point
Requests another target mark (Type 1)
Continues search
Aircraft confirms target location within team
Is there a pressing need to fire?
Does target meet ROE requirements?
Weapons effects and collateral damage considerations?
Aircraft maintain contact with target and continuous SITREP to GME CDR for duration of mission
Does GME CDR and aviation agree?
Does individual aircrew agree?
Aviation engages target and reports BDA to GME CDR

Appendix B

Conduct A Cordon And Search In A Built-Up Area (Infantry Company)

TASK: CONDUCT A CORDON AND SEARCH IN A BUILT-UP AREA

REFERENCES:

(FM 3-06.11)	**(FM 3-07)**	**(FM 101-5)**
(FM 3-21.21)	**(FM 7-10)**	**(FM 101-5-1)**
(FM 3-90.2)	**(FM 7-85)**	**(FM 101-5-2)**

CONDITIONS: The company is conducting operations as part of a larger force and has received an operation order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO) to conduct a cordon and search for insurgents, sympathizers, or materiel such as contraband, evidence, intelligence material, or supplies at the location and time specified. The company is provided an interpreter(s). Army aviation, engineer and explosive ordinance demolition (EOD) assets may be available. Counterintelligence (CI), civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), and military police(MP) with search dogs may be available. The company has communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements. The company has been provided guidance on the rules of engagement (ROE) and/or rules of interaction (ROI). Coalition forces and noncombatants may be present in the operational environment. Some iterations of this task should be conducted during limited visibility conditions. *Based on size of the objective or sensitivity of the objective, company may also act as only a part of a larger operation, as the search force or the cordon force with other coalition forces acting as the search element (i.e., TF 20, operational detachment alpha (ODA) teams, or exploitation teams).*

TASK STANDARDS: The company conducts the cordon and search in accordance with (IAW) tactical standing operating procedures (TSOP), the order, and/or higher commander's guidance. The company establishes a cordon of the designated area without being detected by the insurgents or sympathizers. The company conducts the search and captures all insurgents and enemy material within the cordon. The company complies with the ROE and/or ROI. The company sustains minimal (recommended less than 5%) casualties. The company causes minimal collateral damage and civilian casualties.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO
*1. Company leaders gain and/or maintain situational understanding using information that is gathered from FORCE XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2), frequency modulated (FM) communications, maps, intelligence summaries, situation reports (SITREPs), and other available information sources. (includes human intelligence [HUMINT] and signal intelligence [SIGINT]).		

*2. Company commander receives an OPORD or FRAGO and issues warning order (WARNO) to the company using FBCB2, FM, or other tactical means. *3. Company commander plans using troop-leading procedures. a. Conducts analysis based on factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) and includes the following information in his analysis: (1) Demographics of the area and how different ethnic groups will respond to operations based on their responsiveness to coalition presence, religious practices, and routine civilian practices. (2) Key facilities such as religious sanctuaries, police stations, or hospitals. b. Considers insurgent and/or sympathizer capabilities, likely courses of action (COAs), and specific weapons capabilities. Considers recent activities in the area of operation such as: (1) Contacts. Based on recent activity, commander may request heavy vehicle support, i.e., rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) or mortar fire (2) Civil disturbances (3) Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)		

c. Conducts a digital and/or conventional map reconnaissance. **Note:** Company commander considers how physical reconnaissance will influence the mission based on the target, the area, and the threat. If physical reconnaissance impacts the mission negatively, he avoids a physical reconnaissance of the area just before the search and uses intelligence such as aerial photographs, if available. (1) Identifies search location(s) (2) Identifies tentative security positions (3) Identifies inner and outer-cordon boundaries and other control measures (4) Identifies routes to and from the search area (5) Marks tentative dismount points on digital and conventional maps as appropriate. (6) Identifies C2 locations (to include redundant and RETRANS locations) d. Plans security positions to ensure the protection of the force conducting the operation. e. Designs the cordon to prevent the escape of individuals to be searched. **Note**: Cordon force casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) assets and ability to hold and transport detained personnel must be similar to that of the search teams. f. Divides the cordoned area into zones and assigns a search team. g. Coordinates and synchronizes activities within each battlefield operating system (BOS), as required. h. Develops plan to handle captured and apprehended personnel. I. Addresses actions on contact with belligerents		

j. Organizes the company as necessary to accomplish the mission and/or compensate for combat losses (security element, search element, and reserve element). **Note:** Based on sensitivity of the target, mission can be a combined effort through multiple agencies and units. Commander must understand all units involved in his specific tasks. Coordination and rehearsal with agencies like TF 21, ODA teams, and heavy team reinforcement should be considered. (1) Organizes the search element into special teams. **Note:** This task may be delegated to a subordinate leader. (a) Search team(s) (b) Prisoner(s) handlers (coordinate for counterintelligence (CI) teams) c.) Interrogation team(s) (d) Documentation team(s) (using a recorder with a camera) (e) Demolition team(s) (f) Psychological operation (PSYOP) and/or civil affairs (CA) team(s) (g) Mine detection team(s) (h) Fire support team(s) (I) Scout dog team(s) (j) Tunnel reconnaissance team(s). (2) Tasks the appropriate element with security of C2 nodes and HUMINT sources. (The likelihood of maintaining HUMINT sources and transporting them to the target location for exploitation is high.) *4. Company commander disseminates digital reports (if applicable), overlays, and other pertinent information to each element to keep them keep abreast of the situation. *5. Company commander issues orders and instructions to include ROE and/or ROI to all organic and non-organic elements task organized for the mission.		

a. Issues clear and concise tasks and purposes to platoons and/or elements and/or cordon and search elements. b. Issues list of targeted locations and individuals such as insurgents, sympathizers, criminals, or other suspects to be searched and/or captured and includes photographs if available. c. Issues detailed list of contraband, evidence, intelligence materials, supplies, or other items to be seized and includes list of items prohibited for search and/or seizure. d. Issues instructions to platoons and/or elements that specify how they are to handle suspects and controlled items. e. Issues planning priorities and commitment criteria to the reserve element. 6. Company may conduct or gain information from higher headquarters from prior coordination with local civil police and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) based on the sensitivity of the mission and/or working knowledge of the civilian infrastructure, along with the commander's assessment of the effect of early warning, higher orders, and ROE. 7. Company commander conducts thorough risk management and implements controls, including appropriate force protection measures such as body armor, vehicle protection, and convoy security. 8. Company conducts pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) of personnel, vehicles, special equipment, and mission knowledge, including ROE/ROI, IO themes, special instructions, etc. 9. Company conducts a rehearsal including all elements task organized for the mission, minus HUMINT sources. *10. Company commander issues a FRAGO, as necessary, to address changes to the plan identified during the rehearsal. 11. Company enters way points into position navigation (POSNAV) equipment to aid navigation.		

*12. Company commander coordinates/synchronizes actions of the cordon and search elements. *13. Company commander uses FRAGOs as necessary to redirect actions of subordinate elements. 14. Company elements move to the area to be searched. 15. Cordon element establishes cordon. a. Rapidly moves into the positions. b. Employs Army aviation assets for aerial observation, if aviation assets were requested. **Note:** Early introduction of aviation platforms may provide the enemy with early warning. c. Surrounds the area simultaneously to prevent escape of insurgents and to block any reinforcements (conducted during hours of limited visibility, if possible). d. Positions elements in overwatch or blocking positions to support the cordon and isolate the search area from reinforcements. e. Establishes checkpoints and roadblocks. 16. Search element conducts the search. **Note:** The search may be announced or unannounced IAW the order or situation. a. Conducts the search of suspected insurgents and/or sympathizers, supplies, and equipment with the least inconvenience to the populace using one of three methods. (1) Assembles inhabitants in a central location if they appear to be hostile. (This method provides the most control and simplifies the search and interrogation; however, taking inhabitants away from their dwellings encourages looting and ill feelings.)		

(2) Restricts inhabitants to their homes. (This prohibits civilian movement and discourages looting, but makes control and interrogation difficult.) (3) Controls the heads of households. (Reduces looting and ensures the search teams do not steal anything. This is the best method of searching since it is less disruptive to the inhabitants.) b. Searches all underground and underwater areas. c. Uses observed fire to cover any gaps in the cordon. d. Inspects any freshly excavated ground. (It could be a hiding place.) e. Uses mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater. f. Search team uses female searchers if available. If not available, male Soldiers searching females must take all possible measures to prevent inference of sexual molestation or assault, such as use of metal detector wands, mirror technique, etc. *17. Company commander controls the company's rate of search and directs reorganization as needed. The company maintains a tempo slow enough to conduct effective searches, but rapid enough to prevent the threat from reacting to the search. a. Employs the reserve to assist the cordon and search elements as the situation requires. b. Reports the progress of the company to the higher headquarters commander. c. Enforces the ROE and/or ROI. 18. Company uses minimum essential force to eliminate any active resistance encountered. 19. Company consolidates and reorganizes as necessary.		

20. Company secures captured insurgents as required. a. Uses the least force to detain the insurgents. b. Turns the insurgents over to the local police as soon as the situation allows. 21. Company treats and evacuates casualties. 22. Company processes captured documents and/or equipment as required. Company records the seizure of all contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other items IAW ROE, ROI, and instructions. 23. Company continues operations as directed. Continued operations may include follow-on actions in the search area including patrols (within objective area or contact with facilities like police stations or hospitals that may now have insurgent or insurgent casualties under their care), checkpoints, information operations, and gathering further HUMINT.		

* Indicates a leader task step.

OPFOR TASKS AND STANDARDS

TASK: Conduct Sniper Operations

CONDITION: Red forces are conducting operations independently or as part of a larger force and are ordered to conduct sniper operations against Blue force elements. Blue force elements are occupying an assembly area, conducting tactical movement, conducting a tactical road march, or are otherwise susceptible to a sniper attack. All assigned Red force equipment and personnel are available.

STANDARD: The Red force conducts sniper operations IAW the OPORD and/or commander's guidance. Red force snipers set up well-concealed locations and engage Blue force personnel with short bursts of semiautomatic fire. Red force snipers delay or disrupt Blue force activities and/or kill Blue force personnel. Red force snipers prevent their position from being discovered. Red force snipers report all specified intelligence requirements to higher HQ. (**Note:** During training exercises, the Blue force commander or leader should select the size of the Red force element based on threat doctrine.)

TASK: Defend a Building

CONDITION: Red forces are conducting operations independently or as part of a larger force. The Red force has received an order to defend a

building. All necessary personnel and equipment are available. The Red force has automatic weapons, antiarmor systems, and indirect fire support available.

STANDARD: The Red force defends the building in accordance with (IAW) the operation order and/or commander's guidance. The Red force prevents the Blue force from isolating and entering the building. The Red force blocks or canalizes the Blue force to destroy them or force them to withdraw. The Red force retains control of the designated building or counterattacks to regain and maintain control. (**Note:** During training exercises, the Blue force commander/leader can select the size of the Red force element his unit will face based on current doctrine.)

TASK: Maintain Operations Security (OPSEC)

CONDITION: Red forces are conducting operations independently or as part of a larger force. The Red force prevents the Blue force from obtaining information about its operations and/or intent. All necessary personnel and equipment are available.

STANDARD: The Red force maintains operations security (OPSEC) in accordance with (IAW) the operation order and'/or commander's guidance. The Red force denies information to the Blue force by maintaining physical security, signal security, and information security. The Red force identifies and eliminates indicators that can be exploited by hostile intelligence organizations. (**Note:** During training exercises, the Blue force commander or leader should select the size of the Red force element his unit will face based on current doctrine.)

TASK: Evade/Resist Capture

CONDITION: Red forces are conducting operations independently or as part of a larger force. Red force Soldiers are being overrun or conducting covert operations against the Blue force that makes them susceptible to capture.

STANDARD: The Red force evades/resists capture. If captured, Red force personnel refrain from divulging information about their operations/unit and attempt to escape using every means available. (**Note:** During training exercises, the Blue force commander/leader can select the size of the Red force element his unit will face based on current doctrine.)

Appendix C

Cordon and Search Smart Card

Task Organization
(Non-doctrinal)

Company

- Security Element — Supporting Effort — Outer Cordon
  - Inner Cordon
- Inner Cordon — Supporting Effort
  - Inner Cordon
- Search Element — Main Effort
- Reserve Element — Supporting Effort

Attached or Operational Control (OPCON) Elements
- Field artillery or fire support team (FIST)
- Interpreters or linguists
- Tactical psychological operations (PSYOPs) team (TPT)
- Civil affairs team (CAT)
- Military intelligence
- Military police with search dogs
- Engineers or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
- Reconnaissance or attack aviation

Clearly define C2 relationship
DTG task organization is effective
Attachments attend orders, rehearsals, etc.

Special Teams
- Interpreters or linguists
- Vehicle search teams
- Personnel search teams
- Female search teams
- Escort team
- Prisoner team
- Interrogation team
- Scout dog team
- Mine detection team
- Tunnel reconnaissance team
- Demolition team
- Documentation team

Special Equipment
- Bullhorn
- Breach equipment
- Bolt cutters
- Ladders
- Flashlights
- Metal detectors/wands
- Mine detectors
- Mirrors
- Creepers
- Class IV; i.e., concertina wire
- Zip ties/flex cuffs
- Video cameras, still cameras

Control The Local Populace
- Central location
- Home restriction
- Head of household

Other Considerations
- Reconnaissance
- Tempo
- Local police coordination
- Rules of engagement

Security Element
Supporting Effort

Purpose
- Prevent escape of targeted personnel
- Protect the search team (main effort) from threat reinforcements
- Participate in search

Tactical Tasks
- Interdict
- Isolate
- Block
- Contain
- Deny
- Secure

Methods
- Traffic control points
- Blocking positions
- Patrols
- Observation posts (OPs)/listening posts (LPs)
- Snipers or designated marksmen

Considerations
- Special instructions
- Special equipment
- Interpreters or linguists
- Survivability

Search Element
Main Effort

Purpose
- Provide a safe and secure environment
- Protect coalition forces, civil authorities, and local populace from threat and/or illegal activity
- Free and protect the host nation's government and society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency

Tactical Tasks
- Clear
- Seize
- Secure
- Interdict
- Deny

Methods
- Knock
- Knock down
  - Sequential
  - Simultaneously

Considerations
- Quantity, quality, and reliability of intelligence
- Forces available
- Target

Inner Cordon
Supporting Effort

Purpose
- Protect the search element (main effort) from threat activity such as direct fire, grenades, explosives, or civil disturbances

Tactical Tasks
- Overwatch
- Suppress
- Secure
- Neutralize
- Cover
- Guard

Methods
- Overwatch positions
- Support by fire (SBF) positions
- Snipers or designated marksmen

Considerations
- BPT support by fire
- Plan as a combat operation in urban terrain
- Direct fire plan

Reserve Element
Supporting Effort

Purpose
- Rapidly provide flexibility to the commander
- Often referred to as the quick reaction force (QRF)

Tactical Tasks
- Company/team reserve
- Planning priorities to "be prepared to (BTP)" missions
  - Prioritized based on most likely threats
  - Clear task and purpose for each BPT mission
  - Clearly defined commitment criteria for each BPT mission

Considerations
- Size of element
- Uncommitted element
- Location of reserve (stationary or mobile)
- Ingress and egress routes
- Levels of readiness (REDCON)
- Time standards for response

Appendix D

Rehearsal Slide

Principles of Rehearsals

- Determine attendees, location, and uniform.
- Prioritize events to rehearse.
- Start with generic rehearsals, then conduct mission specific rehearsals after the OPORD is given.
- Attempt to rehearse as many phases of the mission as possible using different rehearsal techniques.
- Rehearse on terrain/under conditions similar to execution.
- Caution using higher's products; not enough detail for subordinate units!
- Rehearse the plan initially, then continue to rehearse contingencies based on 7 forms of contact.

Offense

- Actions on the objective (OBJ)
- Breaching
- Movement techniques/formations
- Actions at danger areas
- Movement in a military operation on urbanized terrain (MOUT) environment
- Actions on 7 forms of contact
  - Direct
  - Indirect
  - Mines/obstacles
  - Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC)
  - Close air support (CAS)
  - Visual
  - Armor

Defense

- Displacement plan
- Counterattack plan
- Security/R-S patrols
- Direct fire plan
  - Direct fire control measures
- Fire support plan
- Trigger points

Types

Confirmation brief: confirms you know higher's plan

Backbrief: brief to higher on your plan

Reduced Force (KLR): involves only selected leaders

Full Force: involves entire unit

Types

Talk Through: orally cover (SOPs) mission expectations

Map: use a map/overlay to brief the plan

FM: review sequence of events using FM radio net

Terrain Model: graphically depict terrain/control measures

Rock Drill: subordinates move rock to simulate actions

Key Leader: use key leaders to physically rehearse

Full Dress: entire unit, similar conditions as execution


Less...
Time
...More
Talk Through
Map
FM
Terrain Model
Rock Drill
Key Leaders
Full Dress
Good Rehearsals = Synchronization
Rehearsals still need to be conducted regardless of how long a unit has worked together because everyone must understand the commander's intent.
Rehearsals identify problem areas and contingency actions.
Rehearsals reinforce subordinates' understanding of the plan and help them visualize the intent.

Appendix E

Cordon and Search STX Lane Development

Cordon and Search:
Concept Sketch

Events

1 ***TLPs***
– Issue order, rehearse, PCCs, PCIs
– Coordinate attack aviation LNO and local police
– Recon OBJ

2 ***Movement to OBJ***
– Convoy from FOB to OBJ area

4 ***Outer cordon emplaced***
8 – POV departs village
– POVs arrive with concealed weapon
6 – Indirect fire on stationary TCP
– Q36 acquisition passed to Co Cdr

11 ***Cold House actions***
5 – Negotiate with occupant
3 – Search Cold House
– Adjust to new intel
7 – C2 the op

9 ***Hot House actions***
13 – FRE fire on unit break contact
10 – FRE attempt to flee by vehicle
5 – Crowd becomes angry
12 – Tech V attacks/drive-by shooting

5 ***Bunker actions***
– Act on bunker location intel

9 ***EXFIL***
– RPG ambush

Collective Tasks

1 Prepare for combat
2 Conduct convoy operations
3 Establish and operate Co CP
4 Establish checkpoints
5 Search a building
6 Conduct a vehicle search
7 React to a civil disturbance
8 Conduct personnel search
9 Take action on contact
10 Employ a reserve
11 Conduct negotiations
12 Employ attack aviation
13 Enter building and clear a room



Detailed script drives tasks to be trained and provides OC team with options to manage intensity based on performance/level of training.

Cordon and Search:
Aviation Concept Sketch



Events

TLPs
– Issue order, rehearse, PCCs, PCIs
– Coordinate attack aviation LNO and local police
– Recon OBJ

1 ***Movement to OBJ***
– Convoy from FOB to OBJ area

Outer cordon emplaced

2 – Indirect fire on stationary TCP
– Q36 acquisition passed to Co Cdr

Cold House actions

3 ***Hot House actions***
– FRE attempt to flee by vehicle
– Tech V attacks/drive-by shooting

Bunker actions

Exfil

Collective Tasks

1 Conduct recon of ground convoy ingress routes

2 Conduct area security vic objective area

3 BPT conduct hasty attacks

O/Cs, both in the air and at the objective area facilitate injects based on unit performance/capability.


STX Lane Daily Timeline
0900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
2300
0100
0300
0500
0700
0900
1100
1300
1500
1700
O/C team link-up (1100)
O/C issues FRAGO
ATK AVN LNO coordination
Air-ground integration LPD huddle
SOF intel products avail
Unit issues FRAGO (1700T) (1/3-2/3)
IPS coordination meeting
NET recon LD (0400)
Outer cordon set NLT 0800
Iteration #1 0800-1100 execution/hot wash
Iteration #2 1100 with ATK aviation
Unit return to FOB (1700T)
AARs complete
• Unit receives FRAGO at 1100 the morning prior to execution
• FRAGO directs NLT 0800 for outer cordon set
• OBJs manned 0400-1400 to support recon and retraining
• Three hours planned time on the OBJ (0800-1100) plus additional two hours (1100-1300) for iteration #2 with OH-58s
• Aviation window 1100-1300

Cordon and Search:
Concept Sketch


POV 2/3/4-2 villagers with hidden weapon in POV waiting to approach outer cordon (1 linguist per vehicle)
Iraqi police services (IPS) in car waiting to enter neighborhood
FOB
FRAGO
Initial Set
• 3 former regime element (FRE) outside of objective area in Tech V waiting to reinforce once fight starts
• 2 FRE mortar crews within 1 km on OBJ with 81 mm mortar and vehicle awaiting fire mission
• 3 FRE inside Hot House
• 2 ready to become minglers
• 1 who will fight from Hot House
• 1 FRE (target) linguist
Arab family in Cold House with head of household linguist
HOT
COLD
Privately owned vehicle (POV) 1-2 villagers heading to work at power plant waiting to exit as soon as BLUFOR gets close (1 linguist)
All villagers in their homes sleeping/just waking up
1 FRE hiding along EXFIL route to conduct RPG ambush during EXFIL
AAR
Cache set in bunker, bunker diagram in Hot House, FRE propaganda in Hot House

Cordon and Search:
Script Review



Event
TLPs

BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Receives order	• OC team delivers OPORD NLT 0900 with ATK aviation LNO
Coordinates target hand-off (THO) with SOF	• O/C acting as TF S-3 passes off SOF THO packet with additional target information
IPS coordination	• Linguist police role player conducts link up at FOB coordination and agrees to meet in the village next day (he will be late)
CDR might decide to put eyes on OBJ	• Order will restrict NET 0200; role players will be in place at 0200

Intent-BLUFOR understands single source human intelligence (HUMINT); outer cordon set NLT 0800

Cordon and Search:
Script Review

Event
Movement to OBJ



BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Convoy ops from FOB	• OC prepared to stop convoy and get them on the right road to the RP; we cannot let BLUFOR interfere with other STX lanes
Attack aviation clears route from RP to OBJ and provides surveillance from SBF	• Ensures COBs (police, POV 2/3/4, Tech V, and mortar crew) cannot be detected
Close on OBJ in order of movement (OOM)	• Keep POV 2/3/4/ and police in his vehicle off BLUFOR routes and outside of their planned TCPs • Villagers still sleeping

Intent-BLUFOR plans and integrates attack aviation

Cordon and Search:
Script Review



Event
Outer Cordon

BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Takes action on vehicle leaving village Takes action on vehicle trying to enter village	• OC directs POV 1 to depart with route and instructions; timing is conducted once outer cordon sets or when assault force is closing on village • POV 2/3/4 staged with OC or commo to call forward as desired; timing can be done anytime during the mission; intent is to test different TCP
Static TCP/roadblock CDR actions attack aviation to mortar location	• Static position/TCP with limited force protection receives 3 rounds of inaccurate indirect fire from direct lay mortar outside of target area; Q36 acquires mortar location, TF relays info to CDR; mortar crew waits 5 minutes then attempts to EXFIL

Intent-Train isolation of OBJ and attack air integration

Cordon and Search:
Script Review

Event
Cold House



BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Realizes police officer is no-show	• If BLUFOR decides to wait for police before continuing, coach CDR to call BN or call police on cell; desired result is for BLUFOR to drive on and not wait for police; if BLUFOR takes too much time, energize the crowd • Iman plays call to prayer and prays over speaker
Identifies Cold House, sets inner cordon, enters house, negotiates, searches	• Curious crowd begins to form vic Cold House after morning prayers • Ensures 2 FRE from Hot House mingle; if M4 concealment impossible, position in/near village ready to attack
CDR receives info from police officer	• OC call police forward while Cold House is being searched, police ID Hot House when unit shows him photo of FRE; be prepared to have villager provide intel if TCP stops police

Intent-Train C2 systems decision making, flexibility, and agility

Cordon and Search:
Script Review



Event
Hot House

BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Re-positions inner cordon on Hot House	• If CDR calls BN with new info, redirect CDR to execute on Hot House • FRE engages • Crowd/and FRE (if undetected) flee to mosque
Unit maneuvers on Hot House; decides to employ reserve; attack aviation ID and engage Tech V with CDR clearance	• FRE kills 2-3 passengers (pax) and/or vehicle • Intent is NOT a mass casualty (MASCAL) event • How you use minglers is your call • Action Tech V into the fight/bypass TCPs and get into a close fight vic village
Unit consolidates Hot House – Searches for contraband – Calls medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) – Captures wounded FRE – Deals with *angry*/frightened mob if reserve is not called forward	• OC acting as BN TOC takes 9-line (no aircraft will actually fly); once casualty treated, ready for movement, and LZ identified/marked, casualty play ends • OCs control reassembly of villagers; if reserve is in village, crowd should be frightened but manageable; if reserve is not employed, the crowd becomes uncontrollable until reserve is employed

Intent-Intel drives maneuver/requires reserve employment

Cordon and Search:
Script Review



BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Unit discovers indications of underground complex/cache during Hot House search. Cdr should put collected intel from Hot House and SOF tactical hand off (THO) intel brief together to begin searching for underground bunker/cache	• Once forward ready line (FRL) has been neutralized, BLUFOR asks villagers if they know about an underground site. Have a villager come forward to guide the force to the site. • BLUFOR will probably still be conducting explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) ops • BLUFOR should destroy/capture cache and enemy combatants. Ensure O/Cs recover all items at AAR site for reset

Intent-Actionable intel that requires subterranean search

Cordon and Search:
Script Review



Event
Exfiltration

BLUFOR Action	OC/Competitor
Unit departs on pre-planned route	• Based on performance so far, be prepared to initiate RGB ambush on one of the TCP elements that did not get into the fight. Obviously, BLUFOR exfiltration plan will drive who/what will be in a position to ambush.
If attack aviation have station time left they should clear route from OBJ to RP	• CO SR can cancel this inject if he thinks training objectives have been met or if convoy is aggressively postured for and during movement. • O/C postures vicinity of AAR site along exfiltration route and stops the unit at the AAR site.

Intent-Train focused force protection, requiring situational awareness and a tactical exfiltration.

Rehearsal/Validation Timeline



Validation Brief Format

1. Lane number and title:	11. Total time allowed:
2. Key observer/controllers (O/Cs) on the lane:	• Troop-leading procedures (TLPs)
3. Start point (SP)/release point (RP) locations:	• Travel
4. Routes:	• Actions on objective (OBJ)
5. After-action review (AAR) location:	• AAR
6. Key events:	• Travel to forward operations base (FOB)
7. Critical tasks:	12. VIP/reception plan
8. Leader tasks:	13. AAR site/plan
9. Retraining standards:	14. Areas of concern
10. Lane specific resources: • Number/type of civilians on the battlefield (COBs) • Number of vehicles • Other critical equipment	

Required Role Play Support

Hours	0200	0300	0400	0500	0600	0700	0800	-900	1000	1100	1200	1300	1400	1500	1600	1700	1800	1900	2000	2100	2200	2300	2400	0000	0100
Total civilians by shift	**140**												**2**												
CARNIS																									
Total role play	**70**												**1**												
Local NON-FLS COBs	**40**																								
Arabic speaking COBs	**27**																								
Arabic speaking Iraqi police	**3**												**1**												
HUFFTON													***Will coordinate for all three villages**												
Total role play	**70**												**1**												
Local NON-FLS COBs	**40**																								
Arabic speaking COBs	**27**																								
Arabic speaking Iraqi police	**3**												**1**												

Cordon and Search:
Additional Resource Requirements

Resources	***Per Lane***	***Total***
Suspects with weapons RPGs	4	8
Tech V with heavy machine guns (HMG)	1	2
Tech V crew	3 pax	6 pax
82 mm mortar with all terrain vehicle (ATV)	1	2
Mortar crew	2 pax	4 pax
Fire markers	1	2
Chairs for AAR site	100	200
IMAM with prayer music	1	2
Moulage kit	1	2
TV with VCR	1	2
Space heaters	5	10
Cache		
AP mines	7	14
AT mines	7	14
Plastic explosives	30 lbs	60 lbs
Ammo can with small arms ammo	6	12
RPG rounds	30	12
Hand grenades	15	30
Iraqi currency	$150,000	$300,000
IED complement (Artillery shell, wire batteries, clocks)	7 ea	14 ea
AK-47 (rubber duck)	7	14

Appendix F

IO Battle Drill for Cordon and Search Operations

Cordon and Search			
Concept: Intelligence operations (IO) deters interference and limits adverse reaction by local populace to cordon and search operations. Be prepared to (BPT) exploit illegal arms / contraband seizure. On orders exploit brigade combat team (BCT) assistance provided to the local populace.			
Element	**Task**	**Purpose**	**Target Audience**
TF Cmd Group	N/A	N/A	N/A
PSYOP	Provide one tactical psychological operations team (TPT) direct support to maneuver forces	Facilitate crowd control	Demonstrators / protestors
	Conduct face-to-face operations with local populace in and around the cordon and search operation	Reduce civilian interference	Local populace
	Prepare and disseminate leaflets to populace in and around the cordon and search operation	Inform populace of activities associated with the cordon and search operation	Local populace
		Exploit success of the operation and gain future assistance from the populace	Local populace
	Develop and broadcast messages on radio stations	Provide factual information about the operation	Local populace
		Exploit success of the operation	Local populace
CA	Assess local leader and populace attitudes after conclusion of the operation	Gauge public opinion/response to entry of BCT troops and seizure of illegal material	Civil leaders Local populace
PA	BPT conduct press conference upon completion of operation	Generate positive and factual media coverage of operation and coalition effort to maintain a safe and secure environment	Political leaders Civil leaders Local populace
Maneuver	Disseminate psychological operations (PSYOP) leaflets in and a round cordon and search operation	Reduce civilian interference	Local populace
End state: Suspected cache site(s) cleared, weapons and illegal goods confiscated with minimal interference and documented, public informed of progress towards a safe and secure environment. BCT IO postured to assist local populace.			

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MESSAGE:	**CDRUSACAC FT LEAVENWORTH, KS // ATZL-CTL//**
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Initial Impressions Reports: Initial impression reports are developed during and immediately after a real-world operation and disseminated in the shortest time possible for the follow-on units to use in educating personnel and supporting training prior to deployment to a theater. Products that focus on training activities may also be provided to support the follow-on unit.

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